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Abstract
This Article tries to wend its way through the trail of human debris, the visions and the shat-
tered dreams on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to a rational analysis of the appli-
cability of international human rights norms, to the conflicting claims of two peoples to the same
land. The right of both Jews and Palestinians to self-determination seems to be self-evident from
the stories of the two peoples. Almost forty years after the Six Days War, the author turns to this
issue in an attempt to analyze where this conflict now stands in terms of international human rights.
This article will concentrate on structuring a basic analytical framework, incorporating both Israeli
and Palestinian perspectives, and will try to show the symmetries and asymmetries between them.
This involves discussion of the rights of two peoples to self-determination and the means by which
such parallel rights can be implemented. It also involves discussing differences in the means of
implementation of the right to self-determination for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and
minority rights for Palestinian-Israelis living in Israel within the 1948 Armistice Lines.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article tries to wend its way through the trail of human
debris, the visions and the shattered dreams on both sides of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to a rational analysis of the applicabil-
ity of international human rights norms, to the conflicting
claims of two peoples to the same land.1 The right of both Jews
and Palestinians to self-determination seems to be self-evident
from the stories of the two peoples. Anecdotally, I was made
vividly aware of this in 1967. I was, at the time, a lecturer at the
University of East Africa at Dar-e-Salaam and part of an activist
New Left group of University faculty members from prestigious
Universities in both Western and Eastern Europe and the United
States. In June 1967, on Day One of the Six Day War, the group
unanimously mourned the probable destruction of "the only de-
mocracy in the Middle East" and the "wiping out of the small
Jewish entity that had survived the Holocaust." However, on Day
Seven, after Israel's victory, the majority reached a consensus
that Israel is an imperialist outpost of America and "as long as
Israel survives in the Middle East, the Arabs will never reach
their full economic, social and cultural potential."2 I dissented,
on the grounds that the Jews, not less than the Arabs, were the
* Professor of Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem and of the College of Manage-
ment Academic Studies. Warmest thanks to my colleagues Dr. Susie Nevot, Dr. Moshe
Hirsch, and Dr. Yuval Shany for their very helpful comments; and to my research assis-
tant, Michal Shapiro, from whose assistance and insight I much benefited. Responsibil-
ity for the end result, of course, remains my own.
1. The reference is to the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean
Sea, including pre-1967 Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. Israel has occupied the entire
area since the Six Day War, which was fought as a war of preemptive self-defence against
the Egyptians, Syrians, and Jordanians after an amassing of troops on Israel's borders
and the illegal closure of Israeli rights of passage through the Straits of Tiran by Egypt.
2. See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, 15th Sess., 947th mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/4684, art. 2 (1960) (stating that "... all peoples have the right to self-determination.
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"wretched of the earth," as Fanon had recently termed the third
world colonized societies, and that this was a fight for survival
and not for expansion. Walter Rodney, a history professor who
later became the leader of the opposition in Guyana, was the
only member of the group to join my dissent. He argued: "This
is not a conflict between Left and Right, between imperialism
and anti-imperialism, but a tragic struggle between two peoples,
both deprived by fate of the right to a country, over one small
patch of land."
Now, almost forty years later, I return to the issue in an at-
tempt to analyze where this conflict now stands in terms of inter-
national human rights. I will concentrate on structuring a basic
analytical framework, incorporating both Israeli and Palestinian
perspectives, and will try to show the symmetries and asymme-
tries between them. This involves discussion of the rights of two
peoples to self-determination and the means by which such par-
allel rights can be implemented. It also involves discussing dif-
ferences in the means of implementation of the right to self-de-
termination for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and mi-
nority rights for Palestinian-Israelis living in Israel within the
1948 Armistice Lines.
I. SELF-DETERMINATION
A. The Right to Self-Determination Under International Law
The Charter of the United Nations listed, among its pur-
poses, respect for the principle of self-determination of peoples.
The 1966 Covenants gave this principle a prominent place in
Article 1 of both, the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights ("ICCPR")4 and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"), 5 as a right: "All
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely put-sue their
economic, social and cultural development.").
3. U.N. CHARrER, art. 1, para. 2.
4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), G.A. Res. 2000,
21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, art. 1, para. 1 (1966), reprinted
in 6 I.L.M. 360, 369 (1967). The ICCPR was adopted on Dec. 19, 1966. It entered into
force on Mar. 23, 1976.
5. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("IESCR"),
G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, art. 1, para. 1
(1966), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967). The IESCR was adopted on Dec. 19,1966. It
entered into force on Mar. 23, 1976.
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peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that
right they resolve to freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."6
Self-determination, thus, emerged as a legal right in the United
Nations ("U.N.") context as a result of the developments in
treaty law. However, neither the conditions of eligibility for the
right, nor the content of the right, are established in the treaties.
Three General Assembly Declarations have made a major
contribution to the development of the "concept or right or
ideal or vision of self-determination."7 The first, the Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, restricted the right to self-determination to colonized
peoples.' The second, the Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions ("Declaration of Friendly Relations"), extended the right
beyond the previously accepted context of decolonization, defin-
ing it as the right of all peoples." The third, the 1993 Vienna
Declaration, reinforced this right as a human right: "The World
Conference on Human Rights considers the denial of the right
of self-determination as a violation of human rights and under-
lines the importance of the effective realization of this right.""'
6. ICCPR, supra n.4, art. 1.
7. See HENRYJ. STEINER & PhILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGI-IS IN CON-
"ri.mx- 1248 (2d ed. 2000) (referencing this concept).
8. See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, sup1ra n.2.
9. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., StIpp. No. 18, at 124-25, U.N. Doc. A/8082
(1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations].
10. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23, art. 2 (1993).
Article 2 reads:
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status, and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development.
Taking into account the particular situation of peoples under colonial or
other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, the World Conference
on Human Rights recognizes the right of peoples to take any legitimate ac-
tion, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to realize their
inalienable right of self-determination. The World Conference on Human
Rights considers the denial of the right of self-determination as a violation of
human rights and underlines the importance of the effective realization of this
right.
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Under these General Assembly Declarations, the right of
self-determination is not to be construed as authorizing impair-
ment of territorial integrity of sovereign and independent States.
Rather, this protection of sovereign integrity is subject to a pro-
viso, making the right to protection of territorial integrity valid
only for those States which "comply with the principle of equal
rights" and whose governments "represent the whole people be-
longing to the territory without distinction of any kind."''
Under an amalgam of the three Declarations, it can be said that
the right of self-determination is regarded as a right either of
previously colonized peoples or of peoples tied by common eth-
nic, religious, or linguistic bonds in a State whose government
fails to represent them without distinction of any kind. This
right, stemming as it does from the three Declarations, is not a
full-fledged international law right, but may be considered an
opiniojuris with persuasive force in establishing a rule of custom-
ary international law.
The establishment of the right of a people to self-determina-
tion is inchoate without a determination of the geo-political
mode which that right will take. The Declaration on Friendly
Relations sets out the various options for self-determination:
"The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the
free association or integration with an independent State or the
In accordance with the Declaration on Principles of International Law con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, this shall not be construed as authorizing
or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a Government repre-
senting the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any
kind.
Id.
11. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra n.9, at 124. The Declaration
reads, in relevant part:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or en-
couraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States, con-
ducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a govern-
ment representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinc-
tion as to race, creed or colour.
Id. See alho Vienna Declaration, supra n.10, art. 1, Sec. 2 (stating that the proviso was
limited to those governments that represented the whole people belonging to the terri-
tory "without distinction of any kind").
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emergence into any other political status freely determined by a
people, constitute modes of implementing the right to self-deter-
mination."' 2 Kirgis, writing on the right to self-determination,
on the basis of the Declaration on Friendly Relations and the
1993 Vienna Declaration, states:
One can . . . discern different degrees of self-determination,
with the legitimacy of each tied to the degree of representa-
tive government in the [S]tate . . . If a government is at the
high end of the scale of democracy, the only self-determina-
tion claims that will be given international credence are those
with minimal destabilizing effect. If a government is ex-
tremely unrepresentative, much more destabilizing self-deter-
mination claims may well be recognized. In this schema, a
claim of right to secede from a representative democracy is
not likely to be considered a legitimate exercise of the right
of self-determination, but a claim of right by indigenous
groups within the democracy to use their own languages and
engage in their own non-coercive cultural practices is likely to
be recognized - not always under the rubric of self-determi-
nation, but recognized nevertheless. Conversely, a claim of a
right to secede from a repressive dictatorship may be re-
garded as legitimate. Not all secessionist claims are equally
destabilizing. The degree to which a claimed right to secede
will be destabilizing may depend on such things as the plausi-
bility of the historical claim of the secessionist group to the
territory it seeks to slice off.'
3
There are many possible modes of implementation and they
include varying degrees of external and internal self-determina-
tion. They include the right to secede and form a State, to inte-
grate within another State, or the right of limited autonomy for
groups, which qualify as "peoples" and are defined by ethnic,
religious, or linguistic bonds. Generally, discussion of the mode
of implementing the right to self-determination subsumes within
it, as modes of implementation, not only governmental auton-
omy, but also collective minority rights. 4 In this spirit, Franck
said: "the probable redefinition of self-determination does rec-
12. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra n.7.
13. Fredric L. Kirgis Jr., The Degrees of Self Determination in the United Nations Era, 88
AM. j. INT'L L. 304, 308 (1994).
14. See Catriona J. Drew, Self-Determination and Population Transfer and the Middle
East Accords, in HUMAN RIGHTS, SELF-DETERMINATION AND POLITICAL CHANCE IN THE OC-
CUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 119-20(1997).
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ognize an international legal right, but it is not to secession but
to democracy." 15
However, I develop my own analysis below with a rather dif-
ferent emphasis, drawing a distinction between self-determina-
tion and minority rights. The right to self-determination exists,
to the extent that it exists, only for peoples who inhabit a territo-
rial continuum within which secession or autonomy may be exer-
cised.'" Under Article 27 of the ICCPR, minority rights exist in-
dependently of the right to self-determination. They exist not
only for peoples who inhabit a territorial continuum, but also for
minorities who do not qualify as such peoples.' 7 The impor-
tance of minority rights for the issue of self-determination as
such, is that States, which fail to provide adequate minority
rights, may lose their right to claim territorial integrity in re-
sponse to a demand for self-determination. Thus, in my schema,
preservation of equality principles, minority rights, and demo-
cratic representation, does not constitute the fulfillment of the
demand for self-determination as much as it constitutes circum-
stances that preempt a claim for self-determination. Legitimate
self-determination claims are claims made in the event of failure
of minority rights and democratic representation. These claims
include measures of external and internal self-determination,
beyond the securing of minority rights and democratic represen-
tation.
The right of external self-determination has been well estab-
lished in the context of the right to be free from alien control, in
the sense of colonialist rule or foreign occupation." Beyond
that context, it has been a controversial and ambiguous right.
The idea of a right to external self-determination has been sub-
15. See T.M. Franck, Post-Modern 7ribalism and the Right to Secession, in PEOP.ES AND
MINORITIES IN INTFRNATIONAi., LAW 20 (1993).
16. See id. at 11. See also, Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Detemnination: A Territorial
Interpretation 16 YAILE.J. IN'L L. 177, 189 (1991).
17. ICCPR, supra n.4, art. 27. Article 27 reads:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practise their own religion, or to use their language.
Id.
18. The General Assembly Resolutions also refer to the right of peoples and to the
particular situation of peoples under colonial or alien control. The Declaration on
Friendly Relations states that subjecting peoples to subjugation, discrimination, and ex-
ploitation, is a violation of their equal rights and self-determination.
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jected to criticism, especially with regard to minority peoples.
The applicability of the right to peoples has been said to make it
inapplicable to minorities, a distinction which emerges from the
ICCPR, which regulates the rights of minorities in Article 27 and
reserves the right to self-determination to peoples in Article 1. "
Where a minority is part of an existing sovereign State, it has
been said that "it is clear that international law does not specifi-
cally grant component parts of sovereign [S] tates the legal right
to secede unilaterally from their 'parent' [S]tate. ' 21 Indeed,
Rosalyn Higgins described such a right of secession as
"postmodern tribalism" and "profoundly illiberal."' Higgins
also stated that:
[T]he perceived need of secession is understandable when
minorities are denied their rights as minorities or when they
cannot participate, as part of the entire peoples of a country,
in the political and economic life of the country. But I am
less sure ... that even this entails a legal right to secession, in
contra-distinction to a compelling political imperative.
22
Alan Buchanan claimed, differently, that secession may be
regarded as a remedial right in cases of persistent and serious
violations of human rights, past unredressed unjust seizure of
territory or discriminatory retribution against the minority peo-
ple. 2 -4
19. ICCPR, supra n.4, art. 1. Article I reads:
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, so-
cial and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth
and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of interna-
tional economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit,
and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own
means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the Present Covenant, including those having respon-
sibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories,
shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall
respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations. Id.
Id. Cf id. art. 27, supra n. 17. See also Rosalyn Higgins, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right
to Secession - Cornments, in PEOPLES AND MINOR]IIES IN INTERNATIONAL Lxw 30 (1993).
20. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 111.
21. See Higgins, supra n.19, at 31-32.
22. Id. at 33.
23. See Alan Buchanan, Self-Determination, Secession and the Rule of Law, in TIHE Mo-
RALIVn OF NATIONAIISM 310 (McKim & McMahon eds., 1997).
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The controversy regarding the right of secession for minor-
ity peoples seems to also extend to some forms of internal self-
determination, such as acquiring governmental autonomy. Au-
tonomy may imply self-government - examples include Quebec
and Scotland. It may be expressed in autonomy of a lesser de-
gree, which involves allocation of territory and some form of in-
ternal self-government that has less than parliamentary expres-
sion - examples include the Indian tribal reservations in
America and Canada. Autonomy seems to fall within the liberal
critique of self-determination: liberals have disdained ethnic par-
ticularity as an organizing principle of political legitimacy, em-
phasizing instead liberal republican virtues of civil equality and
arguing that pluralistic communities based on human rights
standards are preferable. 24 The trend towards granting govern-
mental autonomy has not yet been articulated in any U.N. docu-
ment2 ' and, exforte, it has not achieved the status of an interna-
tional legal right.26 However, the recognition in the Declaration
on Friendly Relations and in the Vienna Declaration of the right
of all peoples to "determine their political status" seems to sug-
gest that minority peoples may, under the conditions set out in
the proviso, have a rightful claim to autonomous government,
just as they may have a rightful claim to secede.
The right of self-determination in international law is "noto-
riously ill-defined '27 and the substantive dimensions of the right
are not delineated. Indeed, the mode of implementation of the
right to self-determination is highly contextualized according to
the socio-political realities of different cases. According to
Franck: "Fortunately for world peace but unfortunately for legal
24. See Diane Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: International Responses to Ethno-Separa-
tist Claims, 23 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1,3 (1998).
25. See Ilan Saban, The Collective Rights of the Arab-Palestinian Minority in Israel: Do
They or Do They Not Exist and the Extent of the Taboo, 26 IVUNEI MISHPAT 241, 244-45 (2002)
(author's trans.) (on file with author) (arguing that international discourse has
changed over the past decade and now includes collective rights, like cultural auton-
omy). Saban also cites, in particular, the General Assembly Declaration on Minorities
of 1992. Yet, he does not claim that a right to autonomous self-government has been
developed; rather, he concentrates on collective rights of minorities to language, cul-
ture, education, religion, etc.
26. See RUTH LAPIDOTH, AUTONOMY. FLEXIBLE SOLUTIONS TO ETHNIC CONFLIC-rs 153
(1997) (stating that partial autonomy granted to Palestinians as a result of the Declara-
tion of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements of 1993 emphasized that
it was to be a temporary, five-year stage on the way to final agreement).
27. See Drew, supra n.14, at 131-32.
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clarity, most of the challenges of postmodern tribal secession...
[are] being managed by a process of conflict resolution without
recourse to the language and procedures of international law."
28
This indeterminacy makes the claim of self-determination diffi-
cult to enforce as a legal right. Indeed, Rodolpho Stavenhagen
questioned whether self-determination was "right or demon"
and argued that the right of collective self-determination must
be treated as "a myth in the Levi-Straussian sense (that is as a
blue print for living); not an enforceable legal, political or moral
right. '29 Becker, discussing the right of self-determination in the
context of the Palestinian case, said: "The parties involved in a
self-determination claim are required to engage in good faith
negotiations to reach an accommodation that is not predeter-
mined by specific legal rules. International law does not guaran-
tee [S] tatehood in such cases nor does it characterize the form
in which relative self-determination will be implemented."3 On
this somewhat shaky basis for the international human right to
self-determination, I shall proceed to discuss the Israeli-Palestin-
ian situation.
B. Israeli and Palestinian Self-Determination
The claim of the Israelis to self-determination has obviously
been implemented in the State of Israel; nevertheless, the issue
is not only of historical significance. The more accurate analysis
of Israel as an expression of Jewish self-determination remains
important for current and future policy and in any discussion of
Palestinian rights. The claim of the Palestinians to self-determi-
nation is in the process of translation into Statehood, by most
views, or into a self-governing autonomy, according to those who
continue to oppose Statehood.
1. Symmetries and Asymmetries in the Claims to
Self-Determination
The implemented claim to self-determination of the Israelis
and the contingent claim of the Palestinians, have unique quali-
28. See Franck, supra n.15, at 15.
29. See Rodolfo Stavenhagen, The Right of Indigenous Peoples to "Self Determination" in
the Contemporary World Order, in SELF-DETERMINATION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 2-3
(Clark & Williamson eds., 1996).
30. See Tal Becker, Self-Determination in Perspective: Palestinian Claims to Statehood and
the Relativity of the Right to Self-Determination, 32 ISRAEL L. REv. 301, 346 (1998).
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ties, as a strange interplay of asymmetries and symmetries.
There is asymmetry between an anciently acquired claim to self-
determination, since interrupted by the Diaspora, and one re-
cently conceived. The Israeli claim to self-determination is
based on the Jewish bond with the Land of Israel from the King-
dom of David and Solomon in 1000B.C., until the Roman expul-
sion of the Jews in 73A.D. It is based on the persistence of com-
mon ethnic, religious, and linguistic bonds during the Diaspora.
The Palestinian claim to separate peoplehood, to be distin-
guished from that of the Arab Nation, first appeared in the twen-
tieth century and was stimulated by the Zionist narrative.
The nature of indigenousness is also asymmetrical. The
Jewish claim is based on the connection with the land as a self-
governing people two thousand years ago, maintaining a minor-
ity habitation and spiritual connection ever since. The Palestin-
ian claim is based on the Muslim rule from the seventh century
until the 1914 War and majority habitation until 1948.
The asymmetry is also between global and local self-determi-
nation. The Jewish claim to self-determination is based on the
desperate need to correct historic wrongs on a global scale, re-
sulting from persecution and discrimination by a majority of
host States over nearly two thousand years of history and culmi-
nating in the Holocaust in Europe in the twentieth century. It is,
arguably, the only case of a claim to self-determination in rem, as
it might be termed, against the entire world. The Palestinian
claim is apparently limited to its resistance to domination by
Israel, as no Palestinian demands to self-determination were
made prior to 1948. Furthermore, at the time of its establish-
ment in 1964, before the Six Day War, the Palestine Liberation
Organization ("PLO") made no claims to external self-determi-
nation as against Egypt or Jordan." The focus of the claim in
the 1964 Palestinian Covenant is Zionism - in the sense of call-
ing for Zionism's destruction. 2 As for Palestinian self-determi-
31. See Palestinian National Covenant, 1964, art. 24 [hereinafter National Cove-
nant 1964]. Article 24 states:
This Organization does not exercise any territorial sovereignty over the West
Bank in the Hashemite Kingdom ofJordan, on the Gaza Strip, or in the Him-
mah Area. Its activities will be on the national popular level in the libera-
tional, organizational, political and financial fields.
32. See id. Introduction. The Introduction reads:
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nation within the Arab world, the document indicates merely
that the Palestinian people wish to be a part of the larger Arab
family."
Alongside the asymmetries, there are also symmetries.
There is symmetry in the emotive and geo-political advocacy for
self-determination. The Jewish claim to self-determination is
based both on expulsion, dispersion, persecution, and the subse-
quent continuous, if minority, habitation in Palestine. As such,
it includes Jews of the Diaspora and continues to regard the lat-
ter as having political rights, should they wish to return. The
Palestinian claim is based on possession, as a result of Arab
habitation, in Palestine prior to 1948. However, it also extends
to the Palestinians displaced in 1948"3 and regards the Palestin-
ian Diaspora - dispersed outside the Palestine since 1948 - as
an integral part of the political entity of Palestine and as sharing
the right to self-determination. Indeed, in this respect, the Pal-
estinian demand for self-determination appears to have been
consciously modeled on the Jewish case. There has, in the past,
been symmetry in the denial by each of the two peoples of the
other's status as a "people." Israeli governments did not initially
accept the definition of the Palestinians as a "people" and, in-
deed, in 1977, Menachem Begin referred to them as "Arab re-
sidents." However, from the time of the Camp David
Frameworks for Peace in 1978, a change took place and since
the time of the 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements in 1993 ("Declaration of Princi-
We, the Palestinian Arab people, who faced the forces of evil, injustice and
aggression, against whom the forces of international Zionism and colonialism
conspire and worked to displace it, dispossess it from its homeland and prop-
erty, abused what is holy in it and who in spite of all this refused to weaken or
submit.
We, the Palestinian Arab people, who believe in its Arabism and in its right to
regain its homeland, to realize its freedom and dignity, and who have deter-
mined to amass its forces and mobilize its efforts and capabilities in order to
continue its struggle and to move forward on the path of holy war (al-jihad)
until complete and final victory has been attained ...
Id.
33. See id. art. 1. Article 1 reads: "Palestine is an Arab homeland bound by strong
Arab national ties to the rest of the Arab countries and which together form the great
Arab homeland." Id.
34. In this context, I will not enter into the different narratives regarding the dis-
placement of the Palestinian population in 1948.
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ples"), 5 Israel has clearly recognized Palestinians as a people.36
The Palestinian Covenants of both 1964 and 1968 - before
and after the Six Day War and the Israeli conquest of the West
Bank and Gaza - denied the existence of a Jewish people and
denied Israel's right to exist: "lt] he establishment of Israel is ille-
gal and null and void. Judaism . . . is not a nationality with
independent existence ... the Jews are not one people with an
independent personality."" This attitude was supported by the
Arab States.39 In 1993, in a letter to Yitzhak Rabin following the
Oslo Accords,4" Arafat, for the first time, acknowledged Israel's
35. See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Sept.
13, 1993) [hereinafter Declaration of Principles].
36. See Becker, supra n.30, at 339-40 (noting that the Israeli Letter of Recognition
of September 9, 1993, which preceded the signing of Declaration of Principles on In-
terim Self-Government Arrangements, referred to the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion ("PLO") as a "representative of the Palestinian people").
37. See National Covenant 1964, supra n.31, art. 17. Article 17 reads:
The partitioning of Palestine which took place in 1947 and the establishment
of Israel are illegal and null and void, regardless of the loss of time, because
they were contrary to the will of the Palestinian people and its natural right to
its homeland, and were in violation of the basic principles embodied in the
Charter of the United Nations.
Id. This stand was repeated in Article 17 of the Palestinian Covenant of 1968.
38. See Palestinian National Covenant, 1968, art. 18 [hereinafter National Cove-
nant 1968]. Article 18 reads:
The Balfour Declaration, the Palestine Mandate System, and all that has been
based on them are considered null and void. The claims of historic and spiri-
tual ties between the Jews and Palestine are not in agreement with the facts of
history or with the true basis of sound [S]tatehood. Judaism, because it is a
divine religion, is not a nationality with independent existence. Furthermore,
the Jews are not one people with an independent personality because they are
citizens to their [S]tates.
Id.
39. After the Six Day War, when Israel proposed to negotiate over the return of the
whole area which had been conquered, the Arab States met in Khartoum and issued the
Khartoum Declaration (Sept. 1, 1967), listing the three negatives: no recognition; no
negotiation; no peace.
40. See 1993 Declaration of Principles ("Oslo Accords") (Sept. 10, 1993). See also
General Assembly/Security Council, Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organ-
ization, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 10, U.N. Doc. A/48/486 S/26560 (1993). The series of
events that lead to the signing of the Oslo Accords on September 13, 1993, began in
1992, when Israel and the Palestine initiated a series of discussions focusing on relations
between both peoples. Both sides to the conflict went through ten rounds of talks. At
the conclusion of the tenth round, both sides stated that they had come to a provisional
agreement, by way of secret talks, that allowed for partial autonomy in the occupied
territories. The eleventh round of talks began in Oslo, Norway, and Israel announced
an agreement that allowed for Palestinian self-rule in the Gaza Strip and Jericho. A
week later, both Israel and the PLO agreed to formally recognize each other after forty-
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right to exist.4 1 Accordingly, he undertook to submit to the Pal-
estinian National Council4 2 a proposal to make the necessary
changes in the Palestinian Covenant. However, although widely
thought otherwise,"3 it is not clear that such a change was ever
formally made. Despite the seeming recognition and confirma-
tion of Israel's right to exist in Arafat's letters to Yitzhak Rabin,
Shimon Peres, and Bill Clinton,44 the failure of the Palestinians
to enact and publish a formally amended version of the Cove-
nant, leaves some ambiguity regarding the Palestinian recogni-
tion of Jews as a people and of the right of Israel to exist as a
State within the pre-1967 borders.45
five years of conflict. All of the agreements reached became known as the "Oslo Ac-
cords."
41. See Letter from Chairman Yasser Arafat to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
(Sept. 9, 1993) [hereinafter Arafat Letter] (providing that PLO recognizes Israel's right
to exist in peace and security).
42. The Palestinian National Council is the legislative body of the PLO.
43. See Richard Falk, Some International Law Implications of the Oslo/Cairo Framework
for the PLO/Israel Peace Process, in HUMAN RIGHTS, SELF-DETERMINATION AND POLITICAL
CHANGE IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 14 (Bowen ed., 1997). See also
Becker, supra n.30, at 336 (arguing that the letters and the subsequent agreements
between the parties "suggest that PLO has publicly restricted its goal of external self-
determination to 1967 territories").
44. See Arafat Letter, supra n.41; Letter From Palestinian Authority ("PA") Presi-
dent Yasser Arafat to Prime Minister Shimon Peres (May 4, 1996). The letter was writ-
ten following the Palestinian National Council ("PNC") extraordinary session held in
Gaza City on April 22-25, 1996. In this letter, Arafat states: "Palestine National Charter is
hereby amended by canceling the articles that are contrary to the letters exchanged
between the PLO and the government of Israel on 9/10 Sept. 1993". Id. See also Letter
from Chairman Arafat to U.S. President William J. Clinton on the Amendments to the
Palestine National Charter (Jan. 18, 1998). In this letter, Arafat states that the PLO is
committed to recognizing "the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security"
and that the "provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the PLO commit-
ment to recognize and live in peace side by side with Israel are no longer in effect." Id.
Arafat also declares: "As a result, Articles 6-10, 15, 19-23 and 30 have been nullified, and
the parts in Articles 1-5, 11-14, 16-18, 25-27 and 29 that are in consistent [sic] with the
above mentioned commitments have also been nullified." Id.
45. The official Palestinian website contains no documentation of any PNC resolu-
tions nullifying the provisions denying Israel's right to exist. Rather, the website con-
tains only a 1996 decision of the PNC mandating the drafting of a new text. The website
continues to carry only the 1964 and the 1968 versions of the Covenant. Additionally, it
includes a reference to Arafat's 1998 letter outlining "the implications" of the 1996
PNC decision and the 1998 reaffirmations of all of the above by both, the Executive
Committee (the Central Council of the PLO) and by show of hands of the participants
at a meeting with the former President Clinton held in Gaza City on December 14,
1998. There also appears to be no amended version of the Covenant to be found. This
does little to clear the impression of ambivalence or evasion.
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2. The Present Status
The Jewish claim to self-determination was recognized in
the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181 (the "Partition Plan")
in 1947,46 and was confirmed in Israel's admittance to the U.N.
as a Member State.4 7 Implementation of this right has been
achieved within Israel's 1949 Armistice Line. 4' Therefore, the
Jewish people's right to self-determination has been fully imple-
mented in the State of Israel and the 1949 Armistice Line has
wide recognition as its international border.
The Palestinian claim to self-determination, expressed in
the Palestinian National Charter of 1964, was not recognized by
the U.N. prior to the Six Day War. The Security Council Resolu-
tion 242 of November 22, 1967, passed immediately after the
War, made no mention of it. Nor was the right addressed after
the Yom Kippur War 4' in the Security Council Resolution 338 of
October 22, 1973. On the other hand, the right was recognized
in a number of General Assembly Resolutions passed after
1969.5o In its Resolution 3236 of 1974, the General Assembly
affirmed the Palestinians' "right to self-determination without
external interference"'" and to "national independence and sov-
ereignty. '5 2 General Assembly Resolutions are not, as such,
46. The Partition Plan called for partitioning of the British-ruled Palestine Man-
date into a Jewish State and an Arab State. It was approved on November 29, 1947.
47. See United Nations, List of Member States, available at http://www.un.org/Over-
view/unmember.html (listing Israel's admission as Member State as of May 11, 1949).
48. See Frederic C. Hot, The Line ofJune 4, 1967,JEwISiH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, available
at http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Peace/671ine.html (explaining that under the
terms of the armistice, Syrian forces were to withdraw east of former Palestine-Syria
boundary and Israeli forces were not to enter evacuated areas, which would become
demilitarized zone, where both Israeli and Syrian forces would be prohibited from en-
tering and carrying on any military or paramilitary activity).
49. Egypt and Syria, in an effort to cause Israel's surrender of the captured lands,
attacked Israel on October 5, 1973, Yom Kippur. After a cease-fire was declared, the
war ended on October 22, 1973, but fighting continued on the Egyptian-Israeli front.
On that same day, the Security Council adopted Resolution 338 calling on all parties to
implement Security Council Resolution 242.
50. See e.g., Becker, supra n.30, at 342 (noting that U.N. organs initially referred to
Palestinians as "refugees" and the Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 and the
Resolutions preceding it made no reference to the Palestinian right to self-determina-
tion).
51. G.A. Res. 3236, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess. Supp. No. 21, U.N. Doc. A/Res/3236,
art. 2(a) (1974).
52. Id. See also Falk, supra n. 43, at 15 (stating that even before the Oslo peace
process, the PLO was recognized as the government of the State of Palestine by more
than one hundred countries). The PLO has been a permanent observer in the U.N.
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binding as general international law. Nevertheless, they may
have status as authoritative interpretations of international law. It
must be remarked that in the Declaration of Principles, the par-
ties agreed to be bound by Resolutions 242 and 338, which did
not address the Palestinian right to self-determination.53 At the
same time, the parties made no mention of the Resolution 3236,
which did reference this right.
54
The Declaration of Principles declared that the aim of the
negotiations was to "establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Govern-
ment Authority, the elected Council (the "Council") for the Pal-
estinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transi-
tional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent
status settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and
338."'5 The final status settlement remained to be determined
in negotiations. In the Declaration of Principles, Israel and the
Palestinian people agreed to "recognize their mutual legitimate
and political rights. '56 However, the precise limits of these rights
were defined no further than they had been in the Security
Council Resolution 242. The most convincing analysis of the
Declaration's impact on the self-determination issue was that of
Antonio Cassese, who stated in 1993: "[F]irstly .... the path sug-
gested by international norms, i.e. a peaceful process of negotia-
tion between the parties, has been taken; secondly, that as an
initial measure, provision has been made for the exercise of inter-
nal self-determination by the Palestinians is a stepping stone to
since November 22, 1974, and Yasser Arafat was the first representative of an entity
other than a Member State to address the General Assembly (excluding the Pope) on
November 13, 1974. Id.
53. Declaration of Principles, supra n.35.
54. Id.
55. Id. art. 1. Article 1 of the Declaration of Principles ("Aim of the Negotiations")
reads:
The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East
peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-
Government Authority, the elected Council (the "Council") for the Palestin-
ian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not
exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the
whole peace process and that the negotiations on the peace process and that
the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
Id. See atso Becker, supra n.30 at 347.
56. Declaration of Principles, supra n.53, Preamble.
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external self-determination."57 In the aftermath of the Oslo Ac-
cords, measures were taken transferring a significant degree of
self-government to the Palestinian Authority ("PA"). 58
In March 2002, in its Resolution 1397, the Security Council,
for the first time, addressed the issue of Palestinian right to self-
determination and affirmed its "vision of a region where two
[S] tates, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and
recognized borders. ' 59 Security Council Resolutions are binding
where they impose State obligations. However, there is some de-
bate whether Resolutions accepted outside Chapter 7 are bind-
ing and, furthermore, the language of Resolution 1397 is ambig-
uous: on the one hand, it dictates a vision of symmetrical State-
hood for Israel and Palestine; on the other, it leaves this dictate
in the form of "a vision".
3. The Right to Self-Determination
Whether on the basis of the general right to self-determina-
tion under international law, as a consequence of State-specific
references to this right in the General Assembly and the Security
Council Resolutions, or by virtue of the recognition of the right
by the peoples themselves, it seems clear that Jews in Israel and
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are both peoples with
the right to self-determination, to the extent that such a right
exists in international law.
a. Modes of Implementation of Israeli and Palestinian
Rights of Self-Determination
Starting with the assumption that both peoples have the
right to self-determination, what, then, is the proper mode of self-
determination for Israelis and Palestinians? Israel's right to self-
determination was a right of the Jewish people and has been sat-
isfied by Statehood. Indeed, in 1948, it could only be solved by
Statehood because the Jewish people, as populations belonging
to other States or living under other governments,60 had been
57. See Antonio Cassese, The Israel-PLO Agreement and Self-Determination, 4 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 564, 571 (1993).
58. However, after the start of the Second Intifada in the year 2000, this self-gov-
ernment has been undermined by the intermittent military re-occupation by Israel of
areas under the control of the PA.
59. U.N. SCOR, 4489th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1397 (2002).
60. See generally MARTIN GILBERT, JEWISH HISTORY ATLAS (1976) (chronicling the
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persistently exposed to threats of persecution and in the Second
World War had been subjected to near annihilation in the Holo-
caust, a situation, which clearly eliminated any possibility of im-
plementation of the Jewish right to self-determination in the ab-
sence of a State.
The position taken in the Palestinian Covenant, claiming
Palestinian Statehood from Jordan to the Mediterranean, cannot
be regarded as having any legitimacy under the precepts of inter-
national law of self-determination. Under that law, Palestinian
entitlement cannot extend beyond entitlement to a separate
State alongside the existing State of Israel. As Alan Gerson
wrote: "Palestinians are entitled to self-determination . . .but
self-determination is not the ultimate value. Self-determination
must be exercised in a context where the rights of other people
to self-determination are respected also, and where the right of a
people to live in peace is respected."6' It seems that since the
Declaration of Principles, the Palestinians have undertaken to
accept this geo-political limit on their right of self-determination
but, as stated, there is evidence that this undertaking has not
been constitutionally internalized.
6 2
What is the proper mode for expression of the Palestinian
right to self-determination? By international law standards, ei-
ther external self-determination via the establishment of a State
or via integration with Jordan, internal self-determination via the
creation of a self-governing territory in confederation with Jor-
dan or Israel, or the enjoyment of full democratic representation
and minority rights in either Jordan or Israel, are all legitimate
options. By process of elimination, only external self-determina-
tion is, as of now, a feasible option. The reasons for this are
contextual. The 'Jordanian option," as it has been called, 6 has
persecution ofJews in both Christian and Muslim societies from the time of the Roman
Empire).
61. See Alan Gerson, Self Determination: The Case of Palestine, 82 Am. J. INT'L L. 349
(1988). See also Becker, supra n.30, at 344 (stating that in order for Palestinian self-
determination to exist, there must be mutual recognition of other people's rights).
62. While for the Palestinians there are nationalist, religious, and ideological mo-
tives for seeking the Greater Palestine, there are, unlike in the Israeli case, no demo-
graphic constraints that make the vision of a Greater Palestine incompatible with Pales-
tinian self-determination.
63. See Yossi Klein Halevi, Israel Should Enlist Jordan in the Cause, WASH. POST, Apr.
28, 2002, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com (describing the Jordanian option
as ceding most of the territories to Hashemites, who governed the West Bank and East
Jerusalem before 1967). See also Danny Rubinstein, Soon, They Will be Gossiping About
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disappeared into the mists of history. It could have satisfied in-
ternational law requirements but it is no longer under considera-
tion. As for the Israeli alternatives of granting internal self-deter-
mination or full democratic representation, neither is feasible.
There is no way that Israel can provide Palestinians in the West
Bank and Gaza with internal self-determination. The Israeli gov-
ernment is not and cannot become sovereign over the entire Pal-
estinian population of the West Bank and Gaza without forfeit-
ing the expression of its own self-determination. The basis for
Israeli Statehood has been and continues to be the right of the
Jewish people to self-determination. For this to be feasible, the
State of Israel must have a majority ofJews in the population and
hence, the government. Indeed, this was a determining factor in
Ben Gurion's decision to accept the Partition Plan, although it
provided Israel with a very reduced area of land for its Statehood
- 19,750 square miles - separated in the Tel Aviv and Haifa
areas. Ben-Gurion stated: "I'm for a State and against partition.
But when I must choose between a non-State with no partition
and a State with partition, I choose partition. This policy is
not compatible with internal self-determination for the Palestini-
ans in the West Bank and Gaza: the pattern ofJewish-Palestinian
population growth is such, that inclusion of the West Bank and
Gaza under Israeli government would inevitably produce a Pales-
tinian majority between Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea by
2005.i The possibility of retention of a non-Jewish population
under Israeli control without voting rights for the central gov-
ernment of Israel, not only would be contrary to the right of self-
determination, but would result in an absolute contravention of
Israel's Basic Laws, which have constitutional force and mandate
that Israel be a Jewish and democratic State.66
Financial Irregularities, HA'ARETZ, May 27, 1994, at 3B (author's trans.) (on file with au-
thor) (discussing the Jordanian option).
64. Yaffa Nakar, U.N. Resolution 181: T'he Partition Plan, November 29th 1947 (Knes-
set Info. Ctr., Nov. 2000) (on file with author).
65. See Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, Projections o lsrael's Population Until 2020
(2002), available at http://www.cbs.gov.il/mifkad/popil00 00-e.htm (assuming popula-
tion growth rate of 2.1% for Jews (natural growth and immigration); 3.2% growth rate
for Arab Israelis; and 3.5% growth rate for Palestinians, and concluding that Arabs be-
tween Jordan and the Mediterranean will outnumber Jews by 2005).
66. See Knesset, Basic Laws - Introduction, available at http://www.knesset.gov.il.
See also text of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, available at http://www.
knesset.gov. Article ]A of this Law reads: "Human Dignity and Liberty, states that the
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It follows that, in light of international law and Israel's own
constitutional law principles, the only feasible way for Palestini-
ans to solidify their right to self-determination is, as stated,
through external self-determination. In practice, Israel did in-
deed recognize the right to Palestinian Statehood at Camp David
in 2000. 6 7 This offer was rejected by Arafat and prompted the
Second Intifada.6 8
b. Terror, Security Needs and Settlements
There is a tragic gap between the Security Council's "vision
of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by
side within secure and recognized borders" and the current real-
ity of the Second Intifada and intermittent reoccupation of areas
under the self-government of the PA by the Israel Defense
Forces ("IDF").6 9 It is beyond the scope of this Article to do
more than indicate some of the reasons for this gap. From the
Israeli side, there is a serious concern over security or geo-strate-
gic vulnerability, which would be the result of the creation of a
Palestinian State, a large percentage of whose population is hos-
tile to the very concept of Israel's right to exist and which is con-
tiguous to a hostile Arab hinterland. Terrorist violence has in-
purpose of the law is to anchor in a fundamental law the values of Israel as a Jewish and
democratic [S]tate." Id.
67. See Mideast Web, The Israeli Camp David I Proposals for Final Settlement July 2000,
available at http://www.mideastweb.org/campdavid2.htm. See also Moshe Maoz, Why
did the Oslo Accord Crash?, 7rii DAY Uul. 2001), available at http://www.7th-day.co.il/
mehumot/madua.htm; Palestinian Ministry of Information (2001), available at http://
www.minfo.gov.ps/main.htm (stating that 90% of West Bank and Gaza Strip, and an-
other few percent of Israeli land swapped for Israeli settlement blocs). The idea of a
land swap was accepted at Camp David already, although the percentage discussed var-
ies (according to the observers) between 1%-5%. According to the Palestinian Ministry
of Information, the information published on July 26, 2001 on its official website, Israel
sought to annex almost 9% of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and in exchange,
offered only 1% of Israel's own territory. In addition, Israel sought control over an
additional 10% of the Occupied Palestinian Territories in the form of a "long-term
lease."
68. This is not the place to enter the controversy surrounding the substance of the
Israeli offer. What is interesting in terms of symmetry and asymmetry is that if the offer
were inadequate in the eyes of the Palestinians because it granted only 91% of the
territory of the West Bank and Gaza, the rejection of the Palestinians stands in contrast
to Ben Gurion's acceptance of the Partition Plan, with its greater drawbacks, in 1948.
69. See Israel Defense Forces ("IDF"), Doctrine, available at http:// www.idf.il/en-
glish/doctrine/doctrine.stm (stating that the organization's mission is to defend exis-
tence, territory, and sovereignty of the State of Israel, and to protect citizens of Israel
and to combat all forms of terrorism).
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creased dramatically since the Second Intifada started in 2000.
The failure of the Camp David negotiations resulted in 472
deaths and 3,425 injuries of Israeli civilians, 70 and 209 deaths
and 1,398 injuries of Israeli soldiers.7 ' In 2002, in the wake of
these intensely violent two years, the large majority of Israeli Jews
- about 60% - have continued to take the view, which they had
during the Barak period, that Israel must separate from the West
Bank and Gaza and that settlements should be removed. 72 How-
ever, there is also a Jewish ultra-nationalist - and in some cases
messianic - minority, which opposes the surrender of the former
Jewish Biblical sites in the West Bank. This minority supports
civil disobedience against army orders to vacate settlements. Iso-
lated individuals from these groups have committed acts of ter-
rorism against Palestinian civilians and assassinated Yitzhak Ra-
bin. Their activities are subject to prosecution and punishment
by the Israeli legal system, although enforcement has become
increasingly sparse.
On the Palestinian side, Israeli settlements in the West Bank
and Gaza pose an obstacle for implementation of Palestinian
self-determination. Israeli settlement activity stretches back to
the 1970s.71 In addition, Palestinians have great difficulty in sur-
rendering their claim to the right of return to the territory,
which was lost in 1948, in the very creation of the State of Israel.
Any form of compromise with the State of Israel is vehemently
70. See Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories,
Statistics, available at http://.www.btselem.org/Hebrew/Statistics/AlAqsa-Fatalities.asp
[hereinafter Btselem] (reporting that as of February 7, 2003, 173 Israeli civilians were
killed in the Territories and 287 Israeli civilians were killed in Israel).
71. See id. (reporting that as of February 7, 2003, 146 Israeli soldiers were killed in
the Territories and sixty-five Israeli soldiers were killed in Israel).
72. See Professor Ephraim Yaar & Dr. Tamar Hermann, Peace Index - November
2002, available at http://www.tau.ac.il/peace/Peace_lndex/2002/English/pnov_02_
e.html (stating that 58% of the Jewish population would approve a Palestinian State;
58% would agree to remove all settlements from the Gaza Strip; 52% are willing to
remove part of the settlements in the West Bank; and 20% are willing to remove all
settlements in the West Bank).
73. See Alon Carmel, Criminal Negligence? Settler Violence and State Inaction During the
Al-Aqsa Intifada, 5(2) PALESTINIAN HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING GROUP REPORT (2001),
available at http://www.phrmg.org/monitor2001/apr2001.htm (reporting that settle-
ments began to be established by Israel in the Occupied Territories directly after the
1967 War). However, it was during Menachem Begin's right-wing Likud government in
1977, that the settlement drive really took off. Id. Between 1977 and 1979, the settler
population more than doubled, from some 4,000 to around 10,000 people. Id.
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and violently opposed by the Hamas, which has the support of
about 20% of the Palestinian population in those territories.75
Since 1991, the Hamas has openly and consistently claimed
credit for terrorist acts against Israeli civilians in Israel and in the
Territories, and against Palestinians suspected of cooperation
with Israel, in order to obstruct progress towards any kind of
peace settlement with Israel. 76 The PLO, which has the support
of 28.1 % of the population, 7 has approved or tolerated terrorist
action by the Tanzim, its own armed-wing.78 These terrorist ac-
tivities have effectively gone unpunished. The escalation of vio-
lence in the Second Intifada has resulted in 1,772 Palestinian
deaths caused in confrontations with the Israeli army. 79 This
number includes a large proportion of militants in armed con-
74. See generally International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Hamas (Is-
lamic Resistance Movement), available at http://www.ict.org.il/interter/orgdet.
cfm?orgid=13 (discussing the history of Hamas).
75. SeeJerusalem Media & Communication Centre ("JMCC"), JMCC Public Opinion
Poll No. 47 On Palestinian Attitudes Towards The Palestinian Situation in General (Dec.
2002), http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2002/no47.htm [hereinafter Public
Opinion Poll].
76. See Hamas, supra n.74. The organizational and ideological sources of Hamas
can be found in the movement of the Muslim Brotherhood ("MB"), which was set up in
the 1920s in Egypt and renewed and strengthened its activity in the 1960s and the 1970s
in the Arab world, mainly Jordan and Egypt. Id. The Hamas movement was legally
registered in Israel in 1978 by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. Id. Hamas defines the transition
to the stage of jihad "for the liberation of all of Palestine" as a personal religious duty
incumbent upon every Muslim. Id. At the same time, Hamas rejects any political ar-
rangement that would consider the relinquishment of any part of Palestine. Id. Vari-
ous Hamas elements have used both political and violent means, including terrorism, to
pursue their goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian State in place of Israel. Id.
77. See Public Opinion Poll, supra n.75.
78. See International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Fatah Tanzim, available
at http://www.ict.org.il (discussing formation and history of Fatah Tanzim). The
Tanzim is the armed wing of the Fatah, the largest faction of the PLO. Id. It is the
paramilitary counter-balance to the military wings of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad. Id. Tanzmin also serves as an informal unofficial "Palestinian army," which at-
tacks Israeli security forces and Jewish civilians without officially breaking signed agree-
ments with Israel. Id. The Tanzim have played a prominent role in carrying out the
activities of the al-Aqsa Intifada, including ambushes of civilian vehicles and bus bomb-
ings in Israeli cities. Id.
79. See Btselem, supra n.70 (citing statistical information available as of February 7,
2003). The reported number of Palestinian deaths includes a large proportion of mili-
tants in armed confrontation with Israeli forces. Id. See also Don Radfleur, An Engi-
neered Tragedy, Statistical Analysis of Casualties in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, September
2000-September 2002, available at http://www.ict.org/il/articles (stating that since Sep-
tember 2000, Palestinian fatalities have consisted of more combatants than non-combat-
ants).
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frontation with Israeli forces."' 80.7% of the Palestinians sup-
port the continuation of the al-Aqsa Intifada8 ' in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip, and 62.7% of Palestinians support terrorist
activity against Israel. 2 However, 46.5% of Palestinians believe
that the preferred solution to the conflict is a two-State solution:
an Israeli State and a Palestinian State. 3
Jewish settlement under Israeli sovereignty in the heart of
the land area required for the expression of the Palestinian right
to self-determination is clearly incompatible with the two-State
vision. As Amos Elon said: "The vast settlement project after
1967, aside from being grossly unjust, has been self-defeating
and politically ruinous." 4 It is not because Palestine is entitled
to be free of Jews - any more than Israel is entitled to be free of
Arabs - that this project has been such a disaster. It is because
Palestine does not merely demand the right of Jews to be admit-
ted as a minority to a future Palestinian State, but rather, holds
on to the concept of the settlers' right to Israeli sovereignty and
the protection of the IDF. This demand undermines the feasi-
bility of external self-determination for the Palestinians and, in
turn, compromises the achievement of self-determination for
Jews in Israel.
The issues of settlements, terrorism, and counter-violence
form a vicious circle, which must be broken. It is those very fac-
tors that obstruct the implementation of the vision of two States,
Israel and Palestine, side by side, which make the realization of
that vision so urgently necessary.
80. See Btselem, supra n.70 (citing statistical information available as of December
28, 2002).
81. See Shaul Shay & Yoram Schweitzer, The Al-Aiqsa lntifada: Palestinian-sraeli Con-
fi-ontation, available http://uww.ict.org.il/articles (discussing AI-Aqsa Intifada). Israel
and the PA have engaged in a violent confrontation, which is viewed differently by each
of the parties. Id. Israel describes the situation as "a limited confrontation that threat-
ens to escalate into a limited war or even a regional war." 1d. The PA defines it as a
popular uprising - "the AI-Aqsa Intifada" or the "Intifada for Independence." Id. For
the PA, the Intifada is a "well-organized popular uprising, whose goal is to further
establishment of the Palestinian [S]tate." Id. See aLso The Mitchell "aport on the Al-Aiqsa
Intifadeh (Apr. 2001), available at http://www.mideastweb.org/mitchell-report.h tm (de-
tailing immediate and long-term roots of conflict).
82. See Public Opinion Poll, supra n.75.
83. Id.
84. See Amos Elon, Israelis and Palestinians: What Went Wrong?, N.Y. RFv. OF BOOKS
(Dec. 19, 2002), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/ 15935.
20031 SELF-DETERMINATION AND MINORITY RIGHTS 475
II. MINORITY RIGHTS
The discussion of self-determination is limited to Jews
within Israel's 1948 Armistice Line and Palestinians in the West
Bank and Gaza. These categories do not include the Israeli-
Palestinians 5 living within the Israeli territory or the Jews living
in the West Bank and Gaza. The purpose of this section of my
Article is to examine minority rights. This will involve only the
situation of the Israeli-Palestinian minority in Israel. The issue
ofJews living in the West Bank and Gaza is not an issue of minor-
ity rights - it is an issue of ongoing occupation after a defensive
war and settlement in the occupied areas. As such, it raises ques-
tions, which go far beyond the scope of this Article - regarding
the initial illegality of settlement, the individual rights of settlers,
the future sovereign powers and democratic obligations of a Pal-
estinian State, and the nature of the political solution to the Is-
raeli-Palestinian conflict.8 6
A. International Law
The rights of minorities are, as stated above, connected to
the issue of self-determination in a negative correlation. Where
minority rights are severely violated, the right of minorities -
who qualify as peoples - to self-determination, may materialize.
Justification for a right of secession or governmental autonomy
rests largely on the existence of serious violations of minority
rights and hence, the issue of self-determination revolves around
the question of minority rights. The following section of this Ar-
ticle will not enter into discussion of the possibilities of secession
or autonomy as political feasibilities for Israeli-Palestinians, but
will concentrate on elucidating their minority rights in Israel. It
should, in any case, be noted that polls taken in Israel on this
issue show that although 52.4% of the Jewish population would
be willing, if a Palestinian State were established, to exchange
large territorial blocs of Israeli-Palestinian population for Israeli
settlement blocs in the West Bank, the large majority of Israeli-
85. 1 use this expression on the one hand, to distinguish this population from the
Palestinian population living in the West Bank and Gaza, and on the other hand, to
respect the preference of the Israeli-Palestinians to be referred to as Palestinians and
not, as they were until recently, the "Arab minority."
86. See Drew, supra n.14, at 120 (discussing that the solution to this question is in a
state of flux). This is evident from the fact that, in the Camp David negotiations, the
Barak government offered to withdraw settlements. Id.
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Palestinians oppose this idea. 7
Minority rights are established in Article 27 of the ICCPR,
which provides: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or lin-
guistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities
shall not be denied the right, in community with the other mem-
bers of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practice their own religion, or to use their own language.""8 Fur-
thermore, pertinent to the rights of ethnic and religious minori-
ties are the provisions according to which all rights under the
ICCPR 9 and the ICESCR?° must be ensured without discrimina-
tion of any kind as to race, language, religion, or national origin.
Under the ICCPR, minorities are entitled, without discrimina-
tion, to the rights to:
1. life;
2. protection against torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrad-
ing treatment;
3. protection against slavery;
4. protection against arbitrary expulsion;
5. liberty and freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention;
6. liberty of movement;
7. a fair and public hearing and protection from retroactive
criminal liability;
8. privacy, freedom of thought and conscience;
9. enjoyment of own culture;
10. freedom of religion;
11. use of own language and freedom of expression;
12. peaceful assembly and freedom of association;
13. marriage and the founding of a family; and
14. protection of minors and equal protection of the law
without discrimination.9 '
Under the ICESCR, minorities are entitled to the exercise,
without discrimination, of the rights to:
1. work and enjoyment of just and favorable working condi-
tions;
2. formation of trade unions;
87. See Tel Aviv University, Peace Index (Mar. 2002), available at http://www.
tau.ac.il/PeaceIndex/2002/English. It should be noted that the support for the idea
was considerably higher among Jewish left-wing voters than those of the right.
88. See ICCPR, supra n.4, art. 27.
89. See id., art. 2(1).
90. See ICESCR, supra n.5, art. 2(2).
91. See generally id.
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3. social security;
4. protection of the family;
5. an adequate standard of living; and
6. the highest attainable standard of health and education. 92
These are the basic minority rights that States Parties to the
ICCPR and the ICESCR are obligated to provide to any minority,
whether under their treaty obligations or under customary inter-
national human rights law. Israel has ratified both the ICCPR
and the ICESCR and hence, is obligated to provide the minority
rights ensconced therein.93
The ICCPR has a clause which permits derogation in time
of a public emergency "which threatens the life of the [N]ation
and whose existence is officially proclaimed."94 This allows
States to take measures derogating from their obligations under
the Covenant to "the extent strictly required by the exigencies of
the situation"" and provided that such measures are not dis-
criminatory on, among other grounds, race, language, or relig-
ion. There can be no derogation from certain obligations, like
the right to life; protection against torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment, or slavery; protection from retroactive
criminal liability; and rights to freedom of thought, conscience,
92. See generally ICESCR, supra n.5.
93. Israel submitted a reservation to Article 23 of the ICCPR relating to the estab-
lishment of gender equality in the area of Family law. The reservation states: "[W]ith
reference to Article 23 of the Covenant, and any other provision thereof to which the
present reservation may be relevant, matters of personal status are governed in Israel by
the religious law of the parties concerned. To the extent that such law is inconsistent
with its obligations under the Covenant, Israel reserves the right to apply that law." See
Uri Regev, Unholy Alliance of Religion and State,JERuSALEM POST (Jul. 3, 1998), available at
http://www.jpost.com/com/Archive/O3.Jul.1998/Opinion/Article-3.html (discussing
Israel's reservation to Article 23 of the ICCPR). Israel entered a reservation on matters
of personal status. This reservation is designed to shield Israel from criticism for im-
posing religious law in this area, mainly in marriage and divorce matters. Id.
94. See ICCPR, supra n.4, art. 4(1). Article 4(1) reads:
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the [N]ation and the
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present
Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the pre-
sent Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations
under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the
ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.
Id.
95. Id.
478 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 26:453
and religion.96
Minority rights have been the subject of particular protec-
tion under the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging
to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities
(1992), which states that it was "inspired" by Article 27 of the
ICCPR and hence, by definition, goes beyond a mere interpreta-
tion of that Section. ' The Declaration is persuasive rather than
authoritative.9 ' It has wide-sweeping provisions, requiring States
to provide protection for the ethnic, cultural, religious, and lin-
guistic identities of minorities and for the cultural, religious, and
linguistic freedoms of their members.""' The Declaration also
provides that persons belonging to minorities have the right to
participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic, and
public life;' ° decisions concerning the minority to which they
belong;112 and the economic progress and development in their
96. Id. art. 4(2). Article 4(2) reads: "No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8
(paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision." Id.
97. See Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Re-
ligious or Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/
Res/47/135 (1992) [hereinafter Declaration on Minorities 1992].
98. Id. Preamble.
99. See e.g. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 85
(1991).
100. See Declaration on Minorities 1992, supra n.97, art. 1. Article 1 reads:
1. States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, relig-
ious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and
shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity.
2. States shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve
those ends.
Id. See also id. art. 4. Article 4 reads, in relevant part:
1. States shall take measures where required to ensure that persons belonging
to minorities may exercise fully and effectively all their human rights and fun-
damental freedoms without any discrimination and in full equality before the
law.
2. States shall take measures to create favourable conditions to enable persons
belonging to minorities to express their characteristics and to develop their
culture, language, religion, traditions and customs, except where specific prac-
tices are in violation of national law and contrary to international standards.
Id.
101. See id. art. 2(2). Article 2(2) reads: "Persons belonging to minorities have the
right to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and public life." Id.
102. See id. art. 2(3). Article 2(3) reads:
Persons belonging to minorities have the right to participate effectively in de-
cisions on the national and, where appropriate, regional level concerning the
minority to which they belong or the regions in which they live, in a manner
not incompatible with national legislation.
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B. The Israeli-Palestinian Minority in Israel
Israeli-Palestinians lived for generations in the area of Israel
before the State was founded; they stayed in or moved into the
area while it was under the colonial rule of a series of foreign
conquerors, ending with the Ottoman Empire and the British
Mandate. Thus, within the State of Israel, Israeli-Palestinians
constitute an indigenous minority" 4 and as such, they have clear
and strong minority claims. The size of the minority is almost
20% of the population. It has been said, that the dominant pref-
erence of the Israeli-Palestinian minority is that Israel become a
bi-national State.'t 05 However, there have been signs that the
current mood of the Israeli-Palestinian minority is to make even
more radical claims. Mohammed Dahle, a lawyer who clerked in
the Supreme Court and set up Adalah, the Legal Center for
Arab Minority Rights in Israel, said:
I know that it is not our fate to be beaten back and downward.
And I know that, in fact, we are not a minority. The whole
idea of a minority is foreign to Islam. It is appropriate to Ju-
daism but foreign to Islam. When you look around you see
that we are really not a minority: that in this country there is a
majority that is actually a minority and a minority that is actu-
ally a majority ... If you open the atlas and look at the map
for a minute, this is what you will see: 300 million Arabs all
around, a billion and a half Muslims. So do you really think
you can go on hiding in this crooked structure of a Jewish
democracy?... At the end of the day, it is the natives, not the
immigrants, who have a supreme right to the country."0 6
Thus, the question of minority rights in the Israeli situation
is played out in the context of a deep ideological rift as to the
very classification of the Israeli-Palestinians as a minority at all
and in the context of a desire of an influential part of that mi-
nority to end Israel's character as a Jewish State. This, indeed,
was the sentiment expressed by almost all the Israeli-Palestinian
103. Id. art. 2(2).
104. Examination of the status of Palestinians who left Israel in 1948 is beyond the
scope of this Article.
105. See Saban, supra n.25.
106. See Ari Shavit, Interview: Travels with Mohammed, HA'ARETZ MAG., Jan. 3 2003
(author's trans.) (on file with author).
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academics at a recent conference held at the Hebrew University
in May 2002. They argued that a two-State solution is at best
temporary and that the only solution is one bi-national State be-
tween Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea.
I shall examine the framework of rights for the Israeli-Pales-
tinians in Israel in four spheres:
1. the right to equal citizenship;
2. the right to non-discrimination and equality of opportu-
nity in economic and social activities;
3. the right to enjoy own culture and practice own religion;
and
4. the rights to political representation and participation.
In this survey of rights, I shall attempt to include all rights,
which have been or might be in dispute, and shall not discuss
rights which are clearly accorded, without distinction, to Israeli-
Palestinians as they are to Jews, such as the rights to freedom of
expression and association; protection against torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment, or against slavery; the right to
marry and found a family; the rights to form trade unions, to
have social security, to enjoy protection of the family, and the
highest attainable standard of health.
1. Equal Citizenship
The character of Israel as a Jewish State and the right of all
inhabitants of the State to equal citizenship is guaranteed in
Israel's Declaration of Independence, which states:
[Israel] will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envis-
aged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equal-
ity of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespec-
tive of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of relig-
ion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will
safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faith-
ful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.1 "7
The Basic Laws on human rights, introduced in 1992, base
the regime of human rights protection on Israel's values as a
'Jewish and democratic State.""'° Implicit in this formula is an
107. See Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel (May 14, 1948),
available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa.
108. See e.g. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1994, and Basic Law: Human Dig-
nity and Liberty, 1992, available at http://www.knesset.gov.il. The Laws also expressly
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apparent tension between the concept of Israel as a democratic
State and Israel as a Jewish State. This tension has been the sub-
ject of intense debate in Israel, not only in the context of the
rights of the Israeli-Palestinian minority, but also with regard to
the various issues of religion and secularism. In the present con-
text, I shall only discuss the implications of the formula as re-
gards ethnic or religious minority rights.
The significance of the formula as a constitutional impera-
tive is, from the Jewish perspective, the very raison ditre of the
State. Israel was established in order to allow the Jewish people
to implement the right of self-determination. The fact that this
is expressly declared and constitutionally guaranteed, rather
than assumed as a demographic fact, results from the traumatic
history of denial of self-determination and even survival rights to
the Jewish people - the history which underlies the creation of
the Jewish State. Perhaps, it is this ongoing denial of legitimacy,
which is expressed so vividly in the words of Mohammed
Dahle. l' In this respect, the formula can be justified as at least a
temporary measure in the process of implementing the right to
self-determination or, alternatively, as a kind of affirmative ac-
tion for the Jewish people. Furthermore, the placing of the re-
quirements of the Jewish and democratic nature of the State on
the same level, may allow for a synthesis into the constitutional
system of only those aspects of the Jewish cultural heritage,
which are consistent with democratic principles. This has, in-
deed, been the view of Justice Barak, the President of the Israeli
Supreme Court, although former Justice Elon, opposed this
view.' 10
incorporate the principles laid down in the Declaration of the Establishment of the
State of Israel, supra n.107.
109. See Shavit, supra n.106 and accompanying text.
110. See Aharon Barak, The Constitutional Revolution: Protected Human Rights, 1
MISHPAT U'MIMSHAL 30 (1992/1993) (author's trans.) (on file with author). According
to Justice Barak:
Reference to [the basic values ofJudaism] is on the universal level of abstrac-
tion, which suits Israel's democratic character; thus, one should not identify
the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish [S] tate with the traditional Jewish
civil law. It should not be forgotten that in Israel, there is a considerable non-
Jewish minority. Indeed, the values of the State of Israel as ajewish [S]tate are
those universal values common to members of a democratic society, which
grew from Jewish tradition and history.
Id.; See also H.C. 506/88, Shefer v. the State of Israel, P.D 48(1), 87, at 168, sec. 57
(author's trans.) (on file with author). According to Justice Elon: "[Tihe synthesis be-
482 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26:453
The identification of Israel with Jews as an ethnic or cultur-
ally identifiable people, is in no way unique in the history of self-
determination and characterizes, most recently, the break up of
the Soviet Union into ethnic States and the division of Yugosla-
via. Furthermore, the designation of Israel as a State associated
with a particular religious denomination is not unique among
democracies. The highly democratic Scandinavian countries
maintain the Scandinavian Church as a national church and En-
gland gives official status to the Church of England. The
formula of a Jewish and democratic State is not, in essence, any
more problematic for human rights of the non-Jewish minority
than for minorities in these other countries. In Kaadan, Justice
Barak, President of the Supreme Court, said:
[T] he values for the State of Israel as ajewish and democratic
State, amongst other things, provide the basis for the right of
the Jewish people to be autonomous in its own sovereign
country... From these values.., a number of conclusions
should be derived: Hebrew will be the main language of the
State and its main holidays will reflect the national revival of
the Jewish people; it is clear that Israel's heritage will be a
central component of the State's religious and cultural heri-
tage ... But, from the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish
and democratic State, it can in no way be derived that the
State will discriminate between its citizens. Jews and non-Jews
are citizens with equal rights and obligations in the State of
Israel.
Nevertheless, even for some of those, and I am among
them, who regard Israel as an expression of the Jewish right of
self-determination, it is questionable whether the best way of im-
plementing this goal is by enacting the formula of a Jewish and
democratic State as a constitutional value, rather than by relying
on it as an empirical fact. Although the constitutional formula
may not beused to derogate from concrete citizenship rights of
minorities and indeed has not been so used by the courts up
tween the terms 'Jewish and democratic [S] tate,' requires preferring the result deriving
from Jewish values, and construing according to them the term 'values of a democratic
[S]tate."' Id.; Menachem Elon, Constitutional Values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and
Democratic State in Light of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 17 IYUNEI MISHPAT 667-
68 (1993) (author's trans.) (on file with author). For a further discussion of this issue
see Sec.l1.B.4.
111. H.C. 6698/95, Kaadan v. ILA, P.D 54(1), 258 (author's trans.) (on file with
author).
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until the time of the writing of this Article, its very posing of a
distinction between majority and minority identities is problem-
atic. As a matter of constitutional human rights, the State
should be considered a State for all its citizens. This, indeed,
corresponds to the concept of the General Assembly and Vienna
Conference Declarations regarding self-determination - a gov-
ernment should represent the whole people belonging to its ter-
ritory, without distinction. Furthermore, as a utilitarian matter,
the constitutional statement that Israel is a Jewish State has little
to offer: Israel will remain Jewish and democratic - a State for
Jewish self-determination - only so long as a critical mass major-
ity of the population is of Jewish ethnicity and culture. I would
venture that the maintenance of "the right of the Jewish people
to be autonomous in its own sovereign country"' 12 can be
achieved by less symbolically problematic means.' '3
112. Id.
113. The rights of citizenship refer to rights of those who are already citizens.
However, it is also claimed that Israel's immigration policy discriminates against Israeli-
Palestinians and violates their right to become citizens. Israel's law of return indeed
does give Jews an automatic right to immigrate and acquire citizenship. This is in line
with the policy of self-determination and affirmative action for the Jewish people to
which I have referred previously. See Ann Dummett, Ministerial Statements - the Immi-
gration Exception in the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 - Introduction, IMMIciATION
LAw PiNmc--rITIONERs' ASSOCIATION ("ILPA") (Apr. 2001), available at http://www.
ilpa.org.uk/ publications/ rractintro.html (stating:
All immigration laws are of necessity discriminatory on grounds of nationality,
since they must distinguish between nationals of the legislating [S]tate and
non-nationals. Whether, or in what circumstances, such discrimination isjusti-
fiable on moral, social, or economic grounds, is outside the scope of this publi-
cation, but legally there can be no doubt that international law permits
[S] tates to control the entry and stay of non-nationals. At the same time, inter-
national law requires [S]tates to admit their own nationals. And it has certain
norms which [S]tates are expected to observe, one of which is that there
should in general be no discrimination on racial grounds.
Id. See generally, Ryszard Cholewinski, Borders and Discrimination in the European Union,
ILPA (Jan. 2002), available at http://www.migpolgroup.com/publications (expressing
criticism of the narrowness of this rule of international law, prohibiting only racist dis-
crimination in immigration and not other forms of discrimination on the basis of
ethnicity or nationality).
Indeed, there is also criticism of Israel's law of return as regards the automatic
right of Jews to immigrate and the limits of immigration of other groups. However,
claims regarding the right of return of Palestinians who left Israel in 1948 are beyond
the scope of this Article. For more on the right of return see StigJagerskiold, The Free-
dom of Movement, in THE INTERNATIONAL BinL OF RIGHTS 180 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981)
(noting that the right of return, or the right to enter one's country in the 1966 Interna-
tional Covenant
... is intended to apply to individuals asserting an individual right. There was
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Army service is commonly considered a duty of citizenship,
although, in current feminist discourse, it is more generally re-
garded as a right. The Israeli-Palestinian population, other than
the Druze 1 4 and the Circassians,'1 5 is exempted from the com-
pulsory conscription to army service imposed on all Jews other
than the Ultra-Orthodox Yeshiva students." 6  Bedouins and
Christians may volunteer for service. Ilan Saban describes this
exemption as an important collective right for the Israeli-Pales-
tinian population." 7 He acknowledges that the blanket exemp-
tion of Muslim Israeli-Palestinians is also clearly based on Israel's
security needs, but nevertheless, regards it as a right. I would
tend to agree with Saban's view regarding the exemption and
this in spite of the fact that Muslims are not merely exempted,
but prohibited from volunteering. The view that the regulation
is an advantage for the Israeli-Palestinian population is indeed
supported by empirical evidence. First, the argument was made
by a Druze conscript who petitioned the High Court of Justice,
that his conscription was discriminatory vis-d-vis the Israeli-Pales-
tinians, who were exempted; this argument was rejected by the
no intention here to address the claims of masses of people who have been
displaced as a by-product of war or by political transfers of territory or popula-
tion, such as the relocation of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe during
and after the Second World War, the flight of the Palestinians from what be-
came Israel, or the movement of Jews from the Arab countries.
Id.
114. The Druze community in Israel receives official recognition as an indepen-
dent religious entity, with separate courts and spiritual leadership. The Druze have a
special standing among other minority groups in Israel and hold respectable positions
in the military, public, and political spheres. The Druze culture is Arab and the lan-
guage is Arabic, but the Druze do not follow mainstream Arab nationalism and serve in
the IDF and the Border Police. There are approximately 104,000 Druze living in Israel,
while they number close to one million worldwide.
115. The Circassians in Israel make up a population of about 3,000 people. They
are Sunni Muslims who participate in Israel's economic and national affairs without
relinquishing their separate ethnic identity either to the Jewish society or to the Muslim
community.
116. The exemptions for both Israeli-Palestinians and Ultra-Orthodox Yeshiva stu-
dents were given under regulations issued by the Minister of Defense. However, the
Supreme Court ruled that the issue of exemption should be regulated by the Knesset
and hence, the continuing policy in this respect must be determined through legisla-
tion. See H.C. 3267/97, Rubinstein and Others v. Minister of Defense, 52(5) P.D. 481
(author's trans.) (on file with author). See also Service Deferral for Yeshiva Students Act
(2002), also known as the "Tal Bill." In principle, the exemption for Arabs too should,
by the same Supreme Court ruling, be regulated in legislation, but this has not yet been
brought up as a political issue.
117. See Saban, supra n.25, at 276-77.
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Court. 18 Second, the Israeli-Palestinian population has consist-
ently opposed establishing non-military national service in lieu
of military service because of the population's refusal to be iden-
tified in this manner with the State of Israel. Third, other
groups in Israel, such as Ultra-Orthodox Jewish Yeshiva students,
fight for group exemption as a collective right. 1 9
2. Non-Discrimination and Equality of Opportunity in
Economic and Social Activities
The legislature and courts, as a matter of principle, auto-
matically bestow civil and political rights on Israeli-Palestinians
in the same way as they do on Jewish Israelis.1 21 Hence, a discus-
sion of rights to non-discrimination and equality of opportunity
118. See H.C. 53/56, Hasuna v. Prime Minister, 10(1) P.D. 710 (author's trans.)
(on file with author).
119. It should be noted that traditionally, army service granted various veterans'
benefits (e.g receipt of government housing loans or specialized child care benefits).
Most of these benefits were removed over the years. However, in Israel's 2002-2003
budget, as a result of a clearly stated policy of preference for veterans, the government
decided to reintroduce the special child care benefits for veterans' families, and to
grant veterans a preferred status in eligibility for unemployment compensation. See
Ministry of Finance, Economic Policy for 2002-2003: Adjustments in the 2002-2003 Budget
12-13 (Apr. 2002) (on file with author). These benefits disadvantage all non-veterans,
including Israeli-Palestinian Muslims, Yeshiva students, and those who do not serve for
reasons of physical or mental fitness.
120. For an unusual exception see Press Release, Adalah, The Legal Center for
Arab Minority Rights in Israel, Minister of Interior Revokes Citizenship of an Arab Citi-
zen of Israel (Sept. 10, 2002), available at http://www.adalah.org/pressrelease/
02_09_10-2.htm (commenting that the Minister of the Interior signed a special decree
officially revoking the citizenship of Mr. Nihad Abu Kishik, an Arab citizen of Israel).
Mr. Kishik was accused of planning a suicide attack in Kfar Saba in April 2002, and of
plotting another suicide attack in Netanya. Id. This decision makes Abu Kishik state-
less, since he does not hold any other citizenship. Id. Under Article 11 (b) of the Citi-
zenship Law of 1952, the Minister of Interior may revoke citizenship of an Israeli citizen
for "breach of allegiance to the State of Israel." Id. The Minister may not exercise his
discretion, however, if his decision contravenes Israel's international legal obligation to
ensure that it does not make its own citizens stateless. Id. Notably, the Government of
Israel wrote, in its 1998 Report to the U.N. Human Rights Committee, that in reality,
citizenship is never revoked for "breach of allegiance." See also Suzanne Goldenberg,
Hated and Feted, GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 2002), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR
THE DEFENSE OF AzMI BisHARA, available at http://www.amzibishara.info/interviews/tg_
20020323.html [hereinafter Azmi Bishara] (commenting on allegations of unequal
police behavior when, at the start of the Second Intifada, the police allegedly opened
fire against Israeli-Palestinian demonstrators or rioters (depending on the version of
the story) and thirteen were killed). An Enquiry Committee was established under the
chairmanship of a Supreme Court Justice; the Committee's decision is currently pend-
ing.
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is relevant in particular with regard to social and economic
rights - including employment, public appointments, budget-
ary allocations, land and housing, health and education. In the
case of social and economic rights, in order to achieve equal op-
portunity, the State has to take a more proactive policy to pre-
vent de facto discrimination in administrative or private sector
bodies, which are instrumental in determining the implementa-
tion of these rights. In the context of this Article, I systematically
discuss the mechanisms in place for the prevention of de facto
discrimination and do not undertake to systematically investigate
the sociological aspects of the de facto disadvantage for the Is-
raeli-Palestinian population. However, I cannot but point out
that much of the legal progress, which was made recently in rec-
ognizing the Israeli-Palestinian population's right to social and
economic equality, was made against a backdrop of governmen-
tal neglect of its administrative responsibility to do so.
The current anti-discrimination legislation in Israel is an
outgrowth of earlier legislation aimed at preventing discrimina-
tion on the grounds of sex or parenthood. That legislation gave
way to laws aimed at preventing discrimination based on a wide
set of group characteristics, including race, religion, nationality,
and country of origin. The protection against discrimination is
now the same for all disadvantaged groups, including Israeli-
Palestinians. The protection against discrimination under the
Equal Employment Opportunities Law' 2 ' and Equal Pay for
Male and Female Workers Law'12 2 provides improved definitions,
procedures, and remedies for employment discrimination. Al-
though women have brought some tens of cases to the Labour
Courts under these Laws, Israeli-Palestinians have not yet been
active in attempts to implement their rights under the Laws.
In 1992 and 1996, legislative amendments were made to en-
sure women fair representation in the directorates of govern-
ment companies 23 and civil service promotions. 24 In 2000,
121. See Equal Employment Opportunities Law, 1988, S.H. 5748 (author's trans.)
(on file with author).
122. See Equal Pay for Male and Female Workers Law, 1996, S.H. 5756 (author's
trans.) (on file with author).
123. See Governmental Companies Law, 1975, S.H. 770, art. 18(a) (author's trans.)
(on file with author).
124. See Civil Service (Appointments) Law, 1954, (Is amended in 1995, art. 15(a)
(author's trans.) (on file with author).
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both of these provisions were amended in order to extend the
requirement of fair representation to the Arab population. 125
Until adequate representation is achieved, government ministers
are obligated to appoint, as far as circumstances allow, Arab di-
rectors, 12 6 and the Civil Service Commissioner is to promote
Arab employees in the civil service.1 2 7 In July 2001, the High
Court of Justice ruled that Arabs should be given more adequate
representation in the Israel Land Council, which determines the
policy of land ownership in Israel. 128 The Court held that the
right to fair representation of the Israeli-Palestinian population
in the public sector is a general right based on the principle of
equality and is not confined to statutory affirmative action pro-
grams.
Although the legal mechanisms are in place to prevent dis-
crimination against Israeli-Palestinians in both, private employ-
ment and public appointments, the results have been disap-
pointing. In terms of the civil service, only 5% of employees are
Israeli-Palestinians, although they constitute almost 20% of the
population. In terms of government companies, there has been
a far more significant impact on women's promotion than on
the promotion of Israeli-Palestinians. 2 ' It should not be forgot-
ten, however, that the gains made by women were only subse-
quent to the successful petition to the High Court of Justice by
the Israel Women's Network"" ° and no such petition has yet
been presented on behalf of Israeli-Palestinians.
One of the main areas of contention for the Israeli-Palestin-
ian minority is that of land and housing. I shall not discuss here
125. It is interesting to note that of the many groups in the highly fragmented and
segregated Israeli society (such as Sephardi Jews or Ethiopian Jews) who are considered
vulnerable to de facto discrimination, it is only the Israeli-Palestinians who have been
included in the fair representation measures.
126. See Governmental Companies Law, supra n.123, art. 18(a) (1) (author's trans.)
(on file with author).
127. See Civil Service (Appointments) Law, supra n.124, art. 15(a) (author's trans.)
(on file with author).
128. H.C. 6924/98, Israel Human Rights League v. the Government of Israel,
54(5) P.D. 15 (author's trans.) (on file with author).
129. See Association for the Advancement of Civil Equality, Sikkuy's Report on Equal-
ity & Integration of the Arab Citizens in Israel 2000-2001, available at http://www.sik-
ktiy.org.il/english/report2001/eng.htm [hereinafter Sikkuy Report].
130. See H.C. 453/94, IMN v. Minister of Transportation, 48(5) P.D. 501 (author's
trans.) (on file with author); H.C. 2671/98, IWN v. Minister of Labor, 52(3) P.D. 630
(author's trans.) (on file with author).
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the land purchase, division, and expropriation, which were car-
ried out in the establishment of the State of Israel, although this
issue is regarded by Israeli-Palestinians as perhaps the most seri-
ous political issue concerning their status in Israel and is com-
memorated by an annual national day of protest, the Land
Day.'31 Kretzmer writes: "Some of the laws.., are no longer in
force, or even if still in force, are no longer applied. In some
respects, the expropriation issue is therefore mainly one of his-
toric importance that has no place in a study on the current le-
gal status of Arabs in Israel." 112 Most of the land in Israel is
owned by the government or the Jewish National Fund
('JNF"). 33 In actual practice, Israel Land Authority ("ILA")
lands are leased and both Arab andJewish citizens of Israel theo-
retically have equal access. However, most of the development
of residential housing is divided into sectors for the Jewish and
Israeli-Palestinian communities, and there are allegations of dis-
crimination in the implementation of zoning and planning laws,
and of inadequate provision for expansion of housing schemes
in Israeli-Palestinian towns and villages.
Three allegations of discrimination in housing have
reached the High Court of Justice. The first allegation was the
unusual case in the Old City in Jerusalem.'34 In that case, the
government undertook the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter
in the Old City, which had been destroyed when the Arab Le-
gion conquered it in 1948, expelling its long-time Jewish re-
sidents. Residence in the reconstructed Jewish Quarter was re-
stricted to army veterans and new immigrants, and excluded Is-
raeli-Palestinians. A petition by an Israeli-Palestinian to live in
the Quarter was rejected by the High Court of Justice on various
131. See DAVID KRETZMER, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE ARABS IN ISRAEL 51 (1990).
132. Id. at 51.
133. In 1960, under Basic Law: Israel Lands, the Jewish National Fund ("JNF")-
owned and government-owned lands were together defined as "Israel lands," and the
principle was laid down that such lands would be leased rather than sold. The JNF
retained ownership of its land, but administrative responsibility for the JNF land, and
also for government-owned land, passed to a newly created agency called the "Israel
Land Administration" ("ILA"). Of the total land in Israel in 1997, the Israel Govern-
ment Press Office statistics show that 79.5% is owned by the government; 14% is pri-
vately owned by the JNF; and the rest, around 6.5%, is evenly divided between private
Arab andJewish owners. Thus, the ILA administers 93.5% of the land in Israel. (Statis-
tics on file with author).
134. See H.C. 114/78, Burkhan v. Minister of Finance, 32(2) P.D. 800 (author's
trans.) (on file with author).
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grounds. Among these, was the justification of the right to reest-
ablish, within the walls of the Old City, a Jewish Quarter along-
side the Muslim, Christian, and Armenian Quarters, and the ar-
gument that Muslims, by religious and administrative edict, re-
fuse to sell any land to Jews and therefore, do not come with
clean hands in demanding equal access to land sold by Jews. 3 '
The second allegation involved the introduction of a highly
subsidized land program for Bedouin purchasers. 136 The Civil
Rights Association of Israel represented a Jewish petitioner who
wanted to purchase land on the same terms. The High Court of
Justice rejected the petition on the grounds that the selectivity of
the program was justified as a compensatory measure, providing
resettlement for Bedouin nomadic tribal groups, who had been
moved off nomadic land areas.1 3 7
The third case, Kaadan v. ILA, was decided in 2000.138 In
this case, an Israeli-Palestinian family submitted its candidacy to
reside as a member in Katzir, a residential community, which
accepted residents according to criteria of suitability applied by a
Residents Committee. The High Court of Justice held that the
residents of Katzir could not refuse to accept membership appli-
cations merely because the applicants were not Jews: "The
[S] tate may not discriminate, directly . . . or indirectly, on the
basis of nationality or religion, in allocation of [S] tate land re-
sources." 39 This ruling applied to the Katzir community be-
cause it indirectly benefited from State funding. It is not clear
that the same ruling would apply to entirely private residential
schemes.
Basic health and education services are provided to the Is-
raeli-Palestinian population on the same basis as to the Jewish
population. However, in education, there is an acknowledged
need for proactive measures since there is a significant gap be-
tween the achievements of Israeli-Palestinian and Jewish school
children - only 35% of the former acquire matriculation certifi-
135. Id.
136. See H.C. 528/88, Avitan v. ILA, 33(4) P.D. 297 (author's trans.) (on file with
author).
137. Id.
138. See H.C. 6698/95, Kaadan v. ILA, 54(1) P.D. 258 (author's trans.) (on file
with author).
139. Id. at 238.
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cates, as compared to 46% of the latter. 14" Beginning in 2000, in
order to ameliorate the situation, a Five-Year Plan for investing
US$10,000,000 a year was adopted, but it was only partially im-
plemented. 141
The Adalah II case, a recent decision of the Israeli High
Court of Justice, introduced the principle of egalitarian propor-
tionality in the distribution of resources.142 In that case, Adalah,
a non-governmental organization ("NGO") for Israeli-Palestin-
ian minority rights, claimed that Muslim burial grounds were be-
ing financed from the State budget at a lower level than were
Jewish burial grounds. The High Court of Justice accepted the
petition and ordered the State to provide proportionally equal
budgets to the different religious groups in relation to their pop-
ulation size. Justice Zamir held: "[T] here is a need to determine
priorities in the distribution of budgets. However, these priori-
ties must be based on material considerations which conform to
the principle of equality and not invalid considerations, such as
religion or nationality."' 4 3 This decision is an important prece-
dent, legitimizing the application of equality to collective and
individual rights of the Israeli-Palestinian minority. 144 The deci-
sion opens the way to equality discourse and legal argument on
budgetary allocations.
In July 2000, the High Court of Justice ruled that the Minis-
try of Education's Department of Education and Welfare for As-
sistance to Weaker Pupils should provide the Arab sector with a
budget proportionate to its part in the population - indeed, by
the time the appeal was brought before the Court, the depart-
ment had already amended its budget plans to allocate 20% of
its budget to the Arab and Druze sector.'45 In December 2001,
the Supreme Court held that the budget allocated to reconstruc-
tion of Arab villages and towns in the Suburb Rehabilitation Plan
should comply with the Arab sector's needs, and anyhow, should
not be any smaller than the relative size of the sector's popula-
140. See Sikkuy Report, supra n. 129.
141. See Wadi'a Awauda, The Five Year Plan for Improving Arab Education: How It's
Holding Up in Reality, in Sikkuy Report, supra n.129.
142. See H.C. 1113/99, Adalah Legal Center v. Ministry of Religion, 54(2) P.D. 164
(author's trans.) (on file with author) [hereinafter Adalah II].
143. Id.
144. See Saban, supra n.25, at 292.
145. H.C. 2814/97, Follow-up Committee on Arab Education in Israel v. Ministry
of Education, 54(3) P.D. 233 (author's trans.) (on file with author).
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tion."4
3. Right to Enjoy One's Own Culture and
Practice One's Own Religion
The most central issues of cultural and religious autonomy
for Israeli-Palestinians in Israel are language, education, and re-
ligion. Arabic is one of the two official languages of Israel, and
informally, it is the second official language.' 47 The significance
of this is that there is an obligation to publish all official State
documents in Arabic as well as Hebrew, and, in addition, individ-
uals have the right of access to State institutions in Arabic. Ilan
Saban remarked that the extent of the right is remarkable and
radical, requiring, as it does, investment of considerable re-
sources and giving, as it does, considerable symbolic recognition
to the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian collective culture.148
However, he also points out that a dissonance has developed be-
tween the legal and socio-political status of the Arabic language
and the fact that Hebrew is, in practice, the sole language used
in State institutions, other than in Arab localities. In a recent
decision, the High Court of Justice held that it is the obligation
of Israel to respect Arabic as the language of the Israeli-Palestin-
ian minority: "Israel is a Jewish and democratic [S] tate and, as
such, it is obligated to respect the minority within it: the person,
his culture and the person's language.""' 9 The Court held that
all official signs must be in Arabic as well as Hebrew, whether
they are in Arab or non-Arab localities.
The education system, public and private, is divided into
Arabic-speaking and Hebrew-speaking education. Public educa-
tion is funded by the State and private education is almost com-
pletely subsidized.15 ° Israeli-Palestinians may register their chil-
dren in Hebrew-speaking education, if they choose.' Thus, in
terms of the right to choose education in the minority's own lan-
guage, the rights of Israeli-Palestinians are fully protected but
146. Council of Heads of Arab Local Authorities and others v. Minister of Con-
struction, Dec. 2001 (not yet published) (author's trans.) (on file with author).
147. See KRETZMER, supra n.131, at 165-66.
148. See Saban, supra n.25, at 261.
149. C.A. 12/99,Jamel v. Sabek, 53(2) P.D. 128 (author's trans.) (on file with au-
thor).
150. See Saban supra n.25 at n.45.
151. See H.C. 4091/96, Abu Shamis v. City of Tel Aviv (1997) (not published) (au-
thor's trans.) (on file with author).
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not exclusionary. Regarding the cultural content of education,
the aims of education were set out in the State Education Law of
1953 and included love ofJewish culture and values and memory
of the Holocaust.1 52 There is no doubt that the curriculum and
the matriculation requirements, determined by the Ministry of
Education, have emphasized Hebrew education, Jewish history
and literature, and have not been adapted to meet the educa-
tional demands of a national collective Arabic culture. However,
an amendment to the State Education Law, passed in February
2000, while restating the declared purposes of public education
in Israel and its general aims - "to love humankind.., to instill
the values of Israel as a Jewish and democratic State and to re-
spect human rights and freedoms.., peace and tolerance"1 51
also includes an important new clause: "to know the language,
culture, history, heritage and unique tradition of the Arab popu-
lation and of other population groups in Israel, and to recognise
the equal rights of all the citizens of Israel."' 54
The right to freedom of religion is fully protected for Jews,
Muslims, and Christians. Israel does not have a separation of
State and religion, but rather, promotes the three monotheistic
religions in a religiously pluralistic way. The personal law of citi-
zens of Israel is determined according to the religious commu-
nity into which they are born. This arrangement is the heritage
of the Millet system, introduced under the Ottoman rule and
maintained under the British Mandate and by Israel after it at-
tained independence. Matters of personal status in marriage
and divorce are determined in accordance with religious laws by
the religious courts of different communities. The Jewish, Mus-
lim, and Druze religious courts are regulated by statute and the
judges' salaries are paid by the State. The decision of the High
Court of Justice in the Adalah II case discussed above, reconfirms
the principle of the obligation of the State to provide propor-
tionately equal budgeting for the various religions.'55 The prob-
lem for all communities is less that of freedom of religion, than
152. See State Education Law, 1953. For background information on Israel's edu-
cation laws, see generally State of Israel Ministry of Education, Facts and Figures (July,
2001), available at www.education.gov.il.
153. State Education Law, 1953, supra n.152, as amended on Feb. 2000 (author's
trans.) (on file with author).
154. Id. art 2(11).
155. See Adalah II, supra n.142 and accompanying text.
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freedom from religion. There is no alternative to civil marriage
and divorce for the secular populations of all communities. The
pluralism of religious freedom is also recognized in the holiday
regulations: although the national rest day and festivals are Jew-
ish, employers are obliged by law to observe the rest days and
festivals of other religions as holidays from work for members of
these communities.
4. Political Representation and Participation
The right of political representation of the Israeli-Palestin-
ian population has centered on the issue of the admissibility of
advocating the demise of Israel as a Jewish State. The long saga
of the High Court of Justice decisions makes it impossible to en-
tertain the full complexities of judicial reasoning. 156 However,
the basic rulings and the statutory framework can be analyzed. I
include brief references to the decisions of the Court regarding
other issues of disqualification in order to allow a fuller under-
standing of the significance of the Court's decisions on the Is-
raeli-Palestinian issue.
In 1965, the Supreme Court disqualified the election candi-
dacy of the el-Ard list, an Arab political movement, on the dual
grounds that the movement was opposed to the Jewish character
of the State, and that it identified with enemies of Israel, who
were pursuing its physical destruction. 1 7 This decision was
given under the Ottoman Law on Associations, which did not
allow the registration of unlawful organizations, but did not pro-
vide any express grounds for disqualifying the candidacy of a po-
litical list. 158
In 1984, in the Neiman I case, the Supreme Court overruled
the decision of the Elections Committee to disqualify the candi-
dacy of the Progressive List for Peace ("PLP"), a political party
started in 1984 and which advocated the establishment of a Pal-
estinian State alongside the State of Israel, as well as that Israel
156. See KRErZMER, supra n.131, at 22-31 (summarizing key legal decisions in Israel
until 1990).
157. E.A. 1/65, Yardor v. Elections Committee for the 6th Knesset, 19(3) P.D. 365.
158. See Ottoman Law on Associations, 1909. The Law was based on the French
Law on Associations of 1901 and remained in force in Israel until 1981. This law regu-
lated the registration and administration of not-for-profit organizations.
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be a State of all its citizens, Jews and Arabs alike." 9 This list
advocated that Israel become a bi-national State. The Court
held that there had been no evidence before the Elections Com-
mittee on which to base a finding that the list denied "the very
existence of the State of Israel or its integrity."''" David
Kretzmer regards the judgment in Neiman I as implying that a
list, which advocates that the State of Israel become a bi-national
State, rather than remain a Jewish State, will not be disqualified,
unless it is actually committed to the physical destruction of
Israel. 6 ' It is notable that in the same decision, the Supreme
Court also overruled the Elections Committee's decision to dis-
qualify the Kach 1 62 list on the grounds of its anti-Arab manifest.
An amendment to the Basic Law: the Knesset was passed
after Neiman T The amended law provided that a list of candi-
dates may not participate in the elections to the Knesset if the
list, in its purposes or its actions, denies the existence of Israel as
the State of the Jewish people, undermines the democratic na-
ture of the State, or incites to racism.' This new statutory pro-
vision was applied by the Supreme Court in the 1988 elections in
its decision to uphold the Elections Committee's disqualification
of the Kach political list on the grounds that Kach denied the
democratic character of the State and was racist."6 4 At the same
time, the Court upheld a decision of the Elections Committee
not to disqualify the PLP.'65 The majority of the Justices were of
the opinion that although the amended law allowed for disquali-
fication of a list on the grounds that it opposed the Jewish char-
acter of the State and even if it did not threaten Israel's security,
there was no sufficiently convincing evidence to disqualify the
PLP on these grounds.166
In 1992, once again the Supreme Court upheld the disquali-
159. See E.A. 2/84, Neiman v. Chairman of the Elections Committee for the 11th
Knesset, 39(2) P.D. 225 (author's trans.) (on file with author).
160. Id.
161. See KRETZMER, supra n.131, at 27.
162. Kach was founded by a radical Israeli-American Rabbi, Meir Kahane, and af-
ter his assassination, his son founded Kahane Chai, or "Kahane Lives."
163. See Basic Law: the Knesset, 1958, as amended in 1985. Text of the law is availa-
ble at http://www.knesset.gov.il.
164. E.A. 1/88, Neiman v. Chairman of the Elections Committee for the 12th
Knesset, 42(4) P.D. 177.
165. See E.A. 2/88, Ben Shalom v. C.E.C for 12th Knesset, 42(4) P.D. 749; 43(4)
P.D. 221.
166. Id.
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fication of Kach and of Kahana Lives, a party that was continuing
the Kach platform. 67 In 1999, in the elections for the fifteenth
Knesset, the High Court of Justice rejected a petition to disqual-
ify the Balad Party of Azmi Bishara although the Justices com-
mented, in their ruling, that some of Bishara's statements ap-
peared to challenge the existence of the State of Israel as the
State of the Jewish people and verged on illegitimacy.168
An additional statutory amendment was made in 2001. This
amendment, Section 7(a), added a further disqualifying crite-
rion: a list of candidates may not participate in elections if the
list supports an armed struggle of an enemy State or a terrorist
organization against the State of Israel. This amendment was
passed shortly after Azmi Bishara was deprived of his immunity
as a Member of Knesset, so that he could be charged with sup-
porting a terrorist organization, the Hezbollah, and with or-
ganizing illegal delegations to Syria, a State with which Israel is
officially at war.169
Several applications were made to the Elections Committee
to disqualify parties and candidates from participating in the
2003 elections. For our purposes here, the four relevant applica-
tions were those to disqualify Azmi Bishara, his Balad Party, and
Ahmed Tibi, 17 on the one hand, and Baruch Marzel, 171 on the
167. E.A. 2858/92, Movshovitz v. Chairman of the Elections Committee, 46(3)
P.D. 541 (author's trans.) (on file with author).
168. At the time of the writing of this Article, the High Court of Justice has taken
the unprecedented step of effectively deleting the factual part of the ruling it made in
1999, which attributed to Bishara the denial of the existence of Israel as a Jewish State,
on the grounds that he had not been called to give evidence and had not had an oppor-
tunity to respond to the allegations.
169. See Arab Association of Human Rights, Weekly Review of the Arab Press in Israel,
No.55/4 (Nov. 10, 2001), available at http://www.arabhra.org/wrap/wrap55.htm (here-
inafter Arab Human Rights] (remarking that Azmi Bishara was charged in November
2001 with violation of the Prevention of Terror Ordinance of 1948, or, in other words,
the support of a terrorist organization). Azmi Bishara is alleged to have publicly stated:
"The Hizballah has won, and for the first time since 1967 we have tasted the taste of
victory. It is the Hizballah's right to be proud of its achievement and to humiliate
Israel." Id. Azmi Bishara is also charged with the violation of Regulation 18(d) of the
Emergency Regulations (Foreign Travel) (Extension of Validity) Ordinance, 1948, I.R.
33. Id. He is alleged to have organized an illegal delegation to visit Syria, which is
officially at war with Israel. See also Azmi Bishara, supra n.120. See generally Gad Barzilai,
The Case of Azmi Bishara: Political Immunity and Freedom in Israel, MIDDLE EAST REP. ON-
LINE (Jan 9, 2001), available at http://www.merip.org/mero/mero010902.html.
170. See Gideon Alon & Yair Ettinger, AG Against Banning Tibi, Dehamshe from Com-
peting in Elections, VIRTUAL JERUSALEM, available at http://www.virtualjerusalem.com/
news/lateststories/?disp_feature=ER918h (stating that Attorney General, Elyakim Ru-
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other. The applications against Bishara, Balad, and Tibi were
based on allegations that they negated the existence of the State
of Israel and supported an armed struggle of an enemy State or
a terrorist organization against the State of Israel. The Elections
Committee accepted the allegations and disqualified these can-
didates and the political party. The Supreme Court reversed all
three decisions on the ground that there was not enough evi-
dence to justify limiting the freedom to participate in the politi-
cal process and allowed Bishara, the Balad Party, and Tibi to par-
ticipate in the upcoming elections. The allegations against
Marzel were based on his having been the former number two
on the Kach list, which had been disqualified in 1988, as well as
the alleged leader of the movement today. The Elections Com-
mittee refused to disqualify Marzel on the basis of his historical
role without evidence of current incitement to racism, and the
Supreme Court confirmed the Elections Committee's decision.
The reasons for the decisions have not been published at the
time of the writing of this Article, but, as was observed by a legal
commentator, it seems clear that the standard of evidence re-
quired for disqualification is so high that, in spite of the lan-
guage of Section 7(a), the right to stand for the Knesset is up-
held as a sacred constitutional right. 172
It is notable that since 1965, in spite of amendments to the
legislation allowing the disqualification of lists which deny the
existence of Israel as the State of the Jewish people, and in spite
of political controversy surrounding the platforms of some of the
Israeli-Palestinian lists, the only lists which have been disquali-
fied are Jewish anti-Arab lists. 171
binstein, was recommending to the Elections Committee to refrain from banning Ah-
med Tibi from running in elections). The call to ban Tibi and his Party, Hadash-Ta'al,
was based on allegations that Tibi advocated, or at least supported, suicide terror at-
tacks against Israelis. Id. See also Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Candidates for the
16th Knesset (Jan.9, 2002), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0mv80
(stating that Elections Committee ruled to disqualify Ahmed Tibi from running in the
January 28 election).
171. See Arab Radical Banned from Israel Poll, BBC NEWS (Dec. 30, 2002), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/2616307.stm (stating that Baruch Marzel is
the former leader of the banned Kach group which has called for expulsion of Arabs
from the West Bank and Gaza). He is a Jewish nationalist and a member of the right-
wing Herut Party.
172. See Ze'ev Segal, Democracy on the Defensive, HA'ARETZ, Nov.1, 2003 (author's
trans.) (on file with author).
173. See Arab Association for Human Rights in Israel, Weekly Review of Arab Press in
2003] SELF-DETERMINATION AMD MINORITY RIGHTS 497
III. THE STATUS OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIANS
This survey shows that the Israeli-Palestinian minority rights
are legally protected on both the individual and collective levels.
There is a pluralistic regime of religious promotion, which in-
cludes Islam and Christianity as well as Judaism, and the Arabic
language is the second official language after Hebrew. In some
recent legislation and in all recent Supreme Court jurispru-
dence, there has been recognition of the rights of the Israeli-
Palestinians to non-discrimination; equal opportunity; fair repre-
sentation in the public sector; and equitable distribution of
budgetary support for services. The socio-economic facts still re-
main the facts of disadvantage accumulated through years of
governmental neglect; however, the recent legal activism of the
Israeli-Palestinian NGOs, especially Adalah, and the directives of
the Supreme Court which have been obtained in response, have
created a legal infrastructure for full equality in the socio-eco-
nomic spheres. Although the State is constitutionally classified
as 'Jewish and democratic," and although the right to stand for
election on a platform of denying the existence of the State of
Israel as the State of the Jewish people is restricted by legislation,
this has not resulted, since 1965, in disqualification of any Israeli-
Palestinian candidate for election, even in the case of radical po-
litical platforms seeking to replace the Jewish State with a bi-na-
tional State.
CONCLUSION
From the Palestinian point of view, the creation of the State
of Israel in 1948, the conquest of territories in the pre-emptive
war of 1967, and the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and
Gaza, which have consistently grown since the 1970s, are appar-
ently regarded as justifying violence and terrorism. 7 4 In the Is-
Israel, No. 104/1 (Jan. 7, 2003), available at http://www.arabhra.org/wrap/wrap104.htm
(commenting that in light of the Bishara and the Tibi scandals in the election of the
16th Knesset, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled only once to disqualify an Arab political
party from running in the Knesset elections). The ruling was delivered in 1965 against
the el-Ard movement, prior to the enactment of Section 7(A), which is entitled "Preven-
tion of Participation in the Elections." Id.
174. Such attempts to justify terrorist attacks on civilians have been rejected by the
U.N. Secretary General in the JENIN REPORT (see REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
PREPARED PURSUANT TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION ES-10/10, available at http://
www.un.org/peace/jenin/) and by the Human Rights Watch, which regarded such at-
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raeli view, the ongoing Palestinian terrorism since the 1920s,
which has dramatically increased since 2000, continuing threats
to Israel's existence by some of the Arab States, and the airing of
vicious anti-Semitic propaganda, v5 combine to create an aggres-
sively defensive strategy to protect the hard- won right of Jews to
self-determination.' 76 That being said, the only way to create a
meaningful human rights regime of self-determination for Is-
raeli-Jews and Palestinians is by peaceful separation into two
States - one for Israeli-Jews and Israeli-Palestinians, and the
other for Palestinians - and by preferably ensuring cooperation
between them. This was basically what was on offer, between
1992 to 2000, in the Oslo, Camp David, and Taba Agreements.
Improvement and implementation of agreements like these,
rather than violence and violation, is the only way forward.
Minority rights of Israeli-Palestinians are being developed
and applied in a period of constant proclaimed emergency. The
ICCPR does not forbid derogation from the State's obligation to
guarantee the right to freedom of expression and freedom of
association "in time of public emergency, which threatens the
life of the [N]ation and the existence of which is officially pro-
claimed," provided that it does not discriminate "solely on the
ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social ori-
gin." ' 77 It is a matter of controversy whether the derogation
clause can be applied to situations of ongoing hostilities rather
than brief acute situations of crisis. In any case, in spite of the
ongoing state of proclaimed emergency in Israel, neither free-
dom of expression nor freedom of association have been cur-
tailed in a discriminatory way and, beyond that, both in legisla-
tion and judicial decisions, headway has been made in mandat-
ing equality of opportunity in the socio-economic sphere.
tacks as crimes against humanity in its 2003 WORLD REPORT, available at http://
hrw.org/wr2k3/.
175. Of which the current Egyptian series of the Protocols of Zion being broadcast
on al Jazeera television throughout the Muslim world is but an example.
176. Israel's military response to terrorist attacks has, in some instances, been con-
sidered disproportionate by the U.N. Secretary General. SeeJENIN REPORT, supra n.174.
The Human Rights Watch viewed them in a similar light in its 2002 Ri.PORr, available at
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/.
177. See ICCPR, supra n.4, art.4(1). See also supra n.94 for full text of this Article.
This Article applies only within the constitutional Boundary of the State. As regards
human rights under Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, see DAVID KRETZMER,
THE OCCUPATION OF.jusrICE: Tuv SUPREME COURr OF ISRAEL AND THI OCCUPIED TERRI-
TORIES (2002) (on file with author).
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Although Israeli-Palestinian minority rights are guaranteed at
the normative declaratory level of Israeli law, they have not yet
been satisfactorily implemented de facto, as regards socio-eco-
nomic distribution of resources.
An analysis of the right of self-determination and minority
rights in the light of international human rights principles gives
pointers for a rational solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Indeed, contrary to Cicero's well-known adage, international
human rights law is not and should not be silent at times of war.
Although the implementation of a rational, human rights-ori-
ented solution becomes extraordinarily difficult in the atmos-
phere of terrorism and counter-violence, which has taken over
the terms of the discourse in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
there is no other acceptable way out of the cycle of violence.
